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ABSTRACT 
 
Huntington's disease (HD) is a genetic, neurodegenerative disorder that is characterized 
by motor, cognitive and psychiatric disturbances. Anosognosia, or lack of awareness of 
symptoms, is commonly observed in neurodegenerative disorders, including HD. Most theories 
suggest that emotion, executive functioning, and memory play important roles in self-awareness. 
There is limited research of anosognosia in HD and no theoretical model of how it manifests in 
the disease. The purpose of this study was to examine Metacognitive Knowledge, or overall 
beliefs about the self, and Online Awareness, or the ability to predict (Anticipatory Awareness) 
and evaluate (Emergent Awareness) task performance, in HD. Fifty-six symptomatic HD 
patients and fifty informants completed the study. Results revealed that those with the best 
executive functioning and lowest apathy were also better able to report on their symptoms. Those 
with the best executive functioning and memory and lowest apathy were the best at predicting 
and evaluating their performance on cognitive tasks.  Patient self-report of memory was 
associated with cognitive performance while self-report of executive functioning and apathy was 
not. Only informant report of apathy and executive functioning was related to cognitive 
performance. For both Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness, HD patients tended to 
have a better awareness of memory than executive functioning. These results suggest that 
awareness in HD is governed by local monitoring systems rather than a single metacognitive 
mechanism. It is also consistent with literature that suggests that individuals are least able to 
! x!
evaluate performance on tasks for which they are poorest in skill level, as HD patients tend to 
have impaired executive functioning and increased apathy with relative sparing of memory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
! 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Huntington’s Disease 
Huntington’s disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative disease that is 
characterized by motor, cognitive, affective, and behavioral disturbances (Novak & Tabrizi, 
2010). The incidence rate of the disease has been estimated to be 0.38 per 100,000 per year, with 
lower incidence rates in Asia compared to Europe, North America, and Australia. Worldwide 
prevalence has been estimated at 2.71 per 100,000 (Pringsheim et al., 2012). HD is caused by an 
abnormal cytosine-adenine-guanine (CAG) trinucleotide repeat expansion of the huntingtin gene 
on chromosome 4 resulting in the production of abnormal huntingtin protein. The function of this 
protein in healthy individuals is unknown (MacDonald et al., 1993; Paulsen, 2011; Walker, 
2007). Individuals who have a CAG repeat length of 39 or more are considered to be gene 
positive and will develop Huntington’s disease during a normal human lifespan (Walker, 2007). 
While evidence suggests that CAG repeat length may influence when motor symptoms manifest, 
repeat length is often not associated with the nature of disease progression within individuals 
(Kieburtz et al., 1994; Lee et al., 2012; Rosenblatt et al., 2012). Currently, HD is diagnosed when 
there is either a positive genetic test or a family history of HD in addition to unequivocal 
extrapyramidal motor signs (Paulsen, 2011). Patients who have tested positive for the CAG 
repeat expansion but have yet to develop motor symptoms are considered to be in the prodromal 
stage of the disease (Pringsheim et al., 2012). Current classifications of disease onset do not take 
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into account that psychiatric and behavioral disturbance and cognitive impairment are often 
observed long before motor symptoms are expressed (Bonelli & Cummings, 2008; Duff, 
Paulsen, Beglinger, Langbehn, & Stout, 2007; Paulsen, 2011; Thompson, Snowden, Craufurd, & 
Neary, 2002). Both cognitive and emotional symptoms have been found to be associated with 
functional capacity independent of motor symptoms, disease duration, and demographic 
information (Nehl, Paulsen, & Huntington Study Group, 2004).  
Often classified as a subcortical neurodegenerative disease, HD pathology results in 
reduced gray matter volume, beginning in the striatum (i.e. putamen and caudate) followed by 
the cerebral cortex (Novak & Tabrizi, 2010; Tabrizi et al., 2009). Striatal volume is reduced as 
many as twenty years prior to the onset of motor symptoms (Aylward et al., 2004). Reduced 
striatal volume impacts frontal-subcortical circuits, which connect subcortical regions to the 
limbic system and frontal lobes (Bonelli & Cummings, 2008). When these circuits are disrupted, 
symptoms associated with damage to the prefrontal cortex, such as executive dysfunction and 
apathy, are commonly observed (Unschuld et al., 2013; Van Duijn, Reedeker, Giltay, Roos, & 
Van der Mast, 2010). This has been demonstrated in a study that suggested HD patients have 
decreased connectivity between the anterior cingulate cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex when 
performing tasks of inhibition (Thiruvady et al., 2007). Furthermore, in early stages of the 
disease, cerebral white matter volume is also reduced, which is associated with poorer 
performance on tasks of processing speed and inhibition (Beglinger et al., 2005). 
Studies have also suggested that anosognosia, or unawareness of deficits, may develop 
with the progression of HD. Patients have been shown to have decreased awareness of several 
domains, including executive functioning, behavioral and emotional control, and activities of 
daily living (Chatterjee, Anderson, Moskowitz, Hauser, & Marder, 2005; Ho, Robbins, & 
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Barker, 2006; Hoth et al., 2007). While several studies have examined anosognosia in HD, 
mechanisms that are associated with anosognosia in HD are still unknown. Though no imaging 
studies have been conducted to date, observed unawareness may be due to disruptions in frontal-
subcortical circuits (McCusker & Loy, 2014; Sitek, Thompson, Craufurd, & Snowden, 2014). It 
is important to gain a better understanding of anosognosia in this population because 
unawareness may have a significant impact on patient care and safety (McCusker & Loy, 2014). 
 
Metacognition and Anosognosia  
 Anosognosia is a multifaceted construct that refers to a lack of awareness or recognition 
of illness or deficits. Babinski was the first to introduce the term “anosognosia,” referring to a 
lack of awareness of motor deficits observed in patients with hemiplegia (Prigatano, 2010). 
Anosognosia can impact some functional domains and not others and manifests in neurologic 
disorders, including HD (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014; Landes, Sperry, Strauss, & 
Geldmacher, 2001; McCusker & Loy, 2014; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014; Prigatano, 2010; Sitek et 
al., 2014).  
Models of general self-awareness suggest that the construct of the self is supported by 
different brain functions and processes and different knowledge bases (Boyer, Robbins, & Jack, 
2005). Gallagher distinguished between the minimal self, which involves the sense of ownership 
of one’s own body and the narrative self, which involves social identity, autobiographical 
memory, and continuity over time. He also described the concept of agency as being the sense of 
ownership of one’s actions or thoughts and the understanding that the self is the one undergoing 
an experience (Gallagher, 2000). Some suggest that autobiographical memory, comprised of 
episodic memory and semantic information about one’s own past is essential in the development 
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of one’s sense of self. Memory allows for the ability to compare current experiences to past 
experiences and to support the idea that the self is durable over time and separate from other 
individuals (Boyer et al., 2005; Conway, 2005; Morris & Mograbi, 2013).  Additionally, theory 
of mind and empathy appear to be important for supporting the idea that the self is distinct from 
other individuals (Boyer et al., 2005).  
 
Models of Anosognosia 
Theoretical models of anosognosia provide a framework for asking questions and 
providing a basis for determining methods of measurement to enhance construct validity of 
studies (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014; Prigatano & Johnson, 2003). One of the challenges in 
studying anosognosia is that there is currently no theoretical model of anosognosia that is 
universally accepted (Prigatano, 2010). Some of the more studied models are described below.  
 
Hierarchical Models 
Stuss and Alexander (2000) postulate a hierarchical model of awareness that includes 
four levels of awareness in the following order: arousal-attention, perceptual-motor, executive 
mediation, and self-awareness. There are bidirectional relationships between each level. The two 
highest levels, executive mediation, and self-awareness are associated with prefrontal cortex 
functioning.  They argue that the highest level of the hierarchy, self-awareness, is the result of 
the convergence of mood states and memory of abstract states, which allows for expectancy for 
the future.  
Similarly, The Prigatano and Johnson (2003) model suggests that there are three vectors 
of consciousness that are arranged in a hierarchical manner: 1) wakefulness, 2) the sense of being 
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aware of the self, and 3) theory of mind. They suggested that the three vectors interact, involve 
overlapping neural circuits, and evolve over time to allow for the survival of the person. 
Additionally, they suggest that heteromodal cortex is important for the development of vectors 
two and three. Heteromodal cortex refers to brain regions that receive input from multiple 
sensory or multimodal areas and allow for the integration of information from multiple sensory 
modalities. Heteromodal cortex is associated with higher order levels of functioning because of 
integration of several cognitive functions (Blumenfeld, 2002; Donnelly, 2011). Many studies 
across patient populations support the theory that there is a relationship between the heteromodal 
cortex (i.e. prefrontal lobe, inferior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and the 
anterior tips of the temporal lobe), unawareness, and theory of mind (Adenzato, Cavallo, & 
Enrici, 2010; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Keenan, Nelson, O'Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; 
Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Rosen, 2011; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).  
Clare and colleagues recently proposed another hierarchical model of awareness. From 
lowest to highest, the levels of awareness include sensory registration, performance monitoring, 
evaluative judgment, and meta-representation. Similar to the Stuss and Alexander (2000), this 
model suggests that performance monitoring may also be influenced by beliefs and expectations, 
task knowledge, feedback, and emotion. Evaluative judgment reflects the general awareness of 
abilities, such as understanding one’s own overall memory functioning or driving ability. They 
suggested that evaluative judgment is separate from performance monitoring in that a patient 
may be able to identify task-specific errors but may still maintain he or she has no difficulty in 
that cognitive domain, such as memory. Similar to Prigatano and Johnson’s (2003) concept of 
theory of mind, meta-representation involves self-reflection and the ability to consider others’ 
perspectives. This includes being aware of having a specific diagnosis and awareness of the 
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impact of symptoms on his or herself (e.g. everyday activities) or others. The individual’s 
knowledge and experience, emotions and attitudes, cultural perspectives, and self-reflection 
influence meta-representation (Clare, Marková, Roth, & Morris, 2011). 
 
Dynamic Model 
Rosen (2011) suggested that awareness is not necessarily hierarchical and that each 
success or failure in task performance leads to changes in self-appraisal. Like many of the other 
models, this theory argues the importance of considering memory and executive functioning in a 
model of unawareness, as both are important in self-appraisal. When a person completes a task, 
there is an activation of performance monitoring systems that compare performance with task 
demands. When a discrepancy is detected, emotional modulators mark the event with a level of 
importance and allow for the event to be evaluated. This information is then stored in long-term 
memory and may be used to update beliefs of one’s own abilities.  Rosen emphasized the 
importance of the emotional component of his model. He suggested that motivation may impact 
the level of monitoring and may also enhance monitoring through the impact of failed tasks.  
Overall, most models of awareness are in agreement that several brain processes and 
regions are involved in the development of self-awareness. Hierarchical models of awareness 
suggest that lower cognitive functions feed into higher cognitive functions to develop awareness. 
In dynamic models, different processes interact to develop awareness.  In both hierarchical and 
dynamic models, executive functioning, emotion, and memory are suggested to be important 
processes involved in awareness. Another model called the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) 
provides an in-depth framework for understanding how these processes interact to influence self-
awareness in neurodegenerative diseases. This model is described in detail below. Also described 
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below in detail, is the Toglia and Kirk Model (2000), as it provides a framework for examining 
general awareness and awareness within the context of a task. Taken together, these two models 
may help provide guidance to better our understanding of anosognosia in HD.  
 
Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM)  
Like other models, the CAM model also acknowledges that anosognosia is multifaceted 
and can result from different lesions of the brain (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Hannesdottir & 
Morris, 2007; Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This model originated from 
Schacter’s Dissociable Interactions and Conscious Experience Model (DICE) in which he 
proposed an overarching mechanism of conscious awareness that interacts with other cognitive 
systems, such as memory (FitzGerald, Carton, O'Keeffe, Coen, & Dockree, 2012; Schacter, 
1990). Agnew and Morris (1998) extended the DICE model to explain anosognosia in dementia 
populations. The model suggested that unawareness occurs when there is a failure to update 
semantic memory about the self in the “Conscious Awareness Mechanism.” A core component 
of awareness is the Personal Database (PDB), which consists of semantic representations of 
conceptual knowledge, including information about one’s own abilities. The PDB changes over 
the lifetime and is influenced by activities and personal experiences. The PDB serves as a 
reference to make evaluative judgments of the self. The model also identifies a central Cognitive 
Comparator Mechanism (CCM) that is under executive control. The purpose of the CCM is to 
compare incoming information to the PDB. If there is a discrepancy, information is sent to the 
Metacognitive Awareness System, which brings the failure to conscious awareness. Issues with 
the CCM may lead to non-domain specific anosognosia. Unawareness may be due to a failure to 
encode information (“mnemonic anosognosia”) or a failure to recognize a mismatch between 
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previously known information about the self and new incoming information because of a 
problem with the comparator mechanism (“executive anosognosia”). This suggests that 
executive dysfunction and memory may have separate contributions to awareness. For example, 
a study demonstrated that unawareness was associated with executive functioning but not 
memory performance in cerebral small vessel disease patients. Unawareness was associated with 
memory functioning in AD, however, and the relationship between executive functioning and 
awareness was only trending (Brookes, Hannesdottir, Markus, & Morris, 2013). The model also 
incorporates the impact of motivation and emotion. The theory suggests that when apathy is 
present, the lack of emotion or motivation results in the failure of stimuli and events to receive 
attention. This leads to reduced error monitoring and as a result, errors and consequences are 
ignored. Additionally, depression may lead to more awareness because it may lead to negative 
biases when judging self-ability, which may impact biased recall of negative information 
(Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Morris & Mograbi, 2013).  
 
Toglia and Kirk’s Model (2000)  
Toglia and Kirk’s model was developed as a modification of Crosson and colleague’s 
(1989) Pyramid Model. This model purports that awareness is not a unitary construct, as 
supported by neuroanatomical studies that show multiple areas and neural pathways that are 
associated with awareness (Crosson et al., 1989; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Toglia and Kirk’s model 
suggests that there are two types of awareness: metacognitive knowledge and online awareness. 
Metacognitive Knowledge (also called intellectual knowledge) is the overall knowledge and 
beliefs about the self or one’s own impairments. Metacognitive Knowledge exists outside of 
engagement in a task or situation. Online Awareness is activated within tasks and situations. 
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There are two types of Online Awareness. Online anticipatory awareness is the ability to predict 
problems before they occur as a result of a deficit. Online emergent awareness is the ability to 
monitor performance and to recognize errors while they occur. Both Metacognitive Knowledge 
and emergent awareness are necessary for anticipatory awareness because pre-existing 
knowledge and self-awareness interact within the context of the task. Some suggest that 
anticipatory and emergent awareness may be related to each other and separate from 
metacognitive awareness (O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2014).  Similar to the 
other models of awareness, affective states are thought to influence expectations of performance. 
Other factors that contribute to unawareness include issues with self-knowledge, overestimation 
of task performance prior to task performance and task performance itself. Other contributing 
factors of unawareness that have similarly been identified in other models include the ability to 
self-monitor, the inability to adjust performance, difficulty with self-evaluation, and the inability 
to integrate new experiences over time. A weakness of this model is that it does not identify 
specific cognitive (e.g. memory, executive functioning) or emotional factors that may contribute 
to the development of metacognitive and online awareness. The model also distinguishes 
unawareness from denial, which is a psychological response to deficits rather than a true lack of 
recognition of deficits. They suggest that denial is a coping response that tends to be 
accompanied by blaming external sources, hostility, and anger, while true unawareness is 
accompanied by perplexity, surprise or indifference. They caution that unawareness and denial 
may occur simultaneously.  
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Anatomical Correlates of Awareness 
Several models of anosognosia have suggested that anosognosia is a multifaceted 
construct and therefore is associated with many different brain regions. In healthy individuals, 
there is evidence for a large-scale, supramodal network that mediates appraisal of self-relevant 
content regardless of content domain (Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). These large neural networks 
include prefrontal and temporal regions, the inferior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, and 
supramarginal gyrus. Activation is often more pronounced in the right hemisphere (Decety & 
Sommerville, 2003; Keenan et al., 2001; Keenan et al., 2000; Rosen, 2011; Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). Additionally, the dorsorostral anterior cingulate cortex may be involved in the effortful 
regulation of attention to introspective information (Krueger 2009).  
Accurate self-awareness involves encoding and retrieval of self-relevant information, a 
process that involves the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Northoff et al., 2006; Schmitz & 
Johnson, 2007; Shany-Ur et al., 2014). Studies have shown that the medial PFC is most active 
when participants think about themselves, such as personality traits, mental states, and physical 
attributes, compared to when they think about others. This suggests that the medial PFC is 
involved in self-reflection processes (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011). Conceptualizations of the 
actions of others are associated with the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) while self-
concept is associated with the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), though others who are 
more closely related to the person also activate ventral areas (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Herbert, 
Herbert, & Pauli, 2011). Schmitz and Johnson (2007) suggested that two top-down networks are 
involved in self-appraisal. First, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex-subcortical network is 
involved with orienting to pre-attentive biasing information that is self-relevant. The dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex-subcortical network is involved with introspection such as self-
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reflection, evaluation, and recollection. Some have suggested that the dorsal medial PFC is 
related to more anticipatory inferences related to goal achievement while the VMPFC enables 
inference of emotional response and reward value following goal achievement (Krueger, Barbey, 
& Grafman, 2009). In addition to prefrontal regions, anterior regions of the temporal lobes are 
believed to play a role in storing knowledge and facts about the self and other individuals (Zahn 
et al., 2007; Zamboni et al., 2013). 
Neuroanatomical findings in healthy populations are congruent with studies of awareness 
in neurodegenerative populations. In a study of neurodegenerative disease patients (i.e. 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), mild cognitive impairment (MCI), Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD), and Frontotemporal dementia), increased self-awareness was associated with greater right 
VMPFC activity and volume (Rosen et al., 2010). In a PET study of AD patients, impaired self-
evaluation was associated with reduced activity in orbital prefrontal and medial temporal 
structures (Salmon et al., 2006). In an fMRI study, AD patients had to answer questions related 
to cognitive, behavioral and physical traits about themselves and their study partner. Activity 
was observed in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal lobes for MCI and control 
patients when rating both self and the informant, suggesting that these areas are associated with 
self-evaluation and also possibly evaluation of familiar individuals. For AD patients, however, 
the medial PFC was only activated during the other rating condition, not self-rating. Left anterior 
temporal lobe activation was decreased during the self-evaluation portion but increased during 
the other-evaluation condition. Larger discrepancies between self and caregiver report were 
associated with reduced activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal regions 
during the self-evaluation procedures. This suggests that the medial prefrontal cortex is involved 
with updated self-awareness (Zamboni et al., 2013).  
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The right hemisphere, in particular, has also been associated with self-awareness. Five 
right-handed patients undergoing the Wada test were shown pictures of faces that were created 
by morphing the patient’s face with a famous person’s face. Following recovery after anesthesia 
of each hemisphere, participants were presented with the two original unmorphed faces and were 
asked to choose which face they had seen previously. Following anesthesia of the left 
hemisphere, all patients selected their own face, while following right hemisphere anesthesia, 
four out of five patients selected the famous face. Similar results were found when they tested 
ten normal participants and used TMS to stimulate the right or left motor cortex (Keenan et al., 
2001). 
Anatomical substrates of anosognosia in symptomatic HD patients have yet to be studied, 
except one study of motor symptom anosognosia. A decrease in striatal volumes (i.e. left and 
right caudate and putamen) has been shown to be related to unawareness of motor symptoms in 
HD patients (Justo et al., 2013). McCusker and Loy (2014) suggested that given research in other 
neurodegenerative diseases and anosognosia, frontostriatal pathway disruptions are a likely 
contributor to impaired awareness in HD. McCusker and Loy (2014) also cited studies that have 
demonstrated increased denial of deficits following right basal ganglia infarcts, also supporting 
the idea that these pathways may be associated with increased unawareness.  
 
Measuring Anosognosia 
Challenges exist in developing methods to study and operationalize anosognosia, which 
also creates challenges in comparing studies that use different methodology. Current methods 
include clinician ratings of patient unawareness, discrepancy scores between patient and 
informant report, discrepancies between patient report and task performance, or a combination of 
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the three methods (Clare, 2004; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014). Nurmi and Jehkonen (2014) 
indicated that many researchers only use one method in studies. In the future, perhaps using 
multiple methods within the same study can alleviate some of the challenges associated with 
measuring anosognosia by providing more information on the convergent validity of these 
methods. 
 
Self-Report and Interviewing Methods 
Regarding discrepancies between patient and informant report, informants are theorized 
to be better able to give accurate ratings than patients. The use of questionnaires is advantageous 
in that they are easily administered, allow for the assessment of a wide range of functioning (e.g. 
activities of daily living, mood, cognitive functioning) and can be compared to different 
objective measures such as cognitive tests or neurologic motor exams. However, informant 
ratings are subjective, as other factors such as the caregiver’s personality, quality of the 
relationship, and caregiver burden may influence informants’ report (Clare, 2004; Hoth, 2005; 
Prigatano & Johnson, 2003; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Clinicians may be more objective than 
caregivers and may be more familiar with the concept of unawareness and expectations of 
functioning in neurologic populations. However, clinicians rarely observe patients in real-world 
settings and typically obtain information from caregivers and patients, which may reduce 
objectivity of clinicians’ rating (Clare, 2004; Hoth, 2005; Prigatano & Johnson, 2003). Some 
suggest patient/informant discrepancies are more valid for measuring awareness of everyday 
function, while clinician ratings may be more valid for measuring awareness of cognitive 
functioning, as studies have indicated that relationships between factors influencing awareness 
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are moderated based on measurement method used (Snow et al., 2005; Tremont & Alosco, 
2011).  
 
Performance Prediction and Evaluation Method 
The performance prediction and evaluation method involves the participant reporting on 
how well he or she will complete a task (prediction) or how well he or she has completed a task 
(evaluation). The outcome measure is quantifiable, as several research groups have come up with 
methods to measure performance prediction such as analog scales and bell curves. Convergent 
validity has been demonstrated for bell curve methods in dementia populations; high correlations 
(i.e. above r=.8) have been found when comparing verbal prediction ratings and predictions 
using bell curve ratings (Williamson et al., 2009). Performance prediction and evaluation 
methods are considered the most objective measures of awareness because of the non-reliance on 
either a clinician or an informant. However, this method can only be used for tasks where 
performance can be measured by direct observation (e.g. a driving test) and cannot be used to 
measure other more inferred psychological constructs (e.g. depression). Furthermore, the 
ecological validity of this method must be considered. If a person had not been exposed to a 
similar task previously, it may be difficult for him or her to predict performance, regardless of 
how aware he or she is (Hoth, 2005; Williamson et al., 2009). Another consideration is 
performance prediction methods are not tapping into a pathological deficit, but rather a common 
feature of human cognition. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that 
heuristics, or mental shortcuts, may lead to errors in judgment. Specifically, availability 
heuristics influence the tendency of making decisions based on how easily past events come to 
mind. Confirmation biases is another heuristic that involves the tendency to seek out information 
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that confirms existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). If a person has a specific belief about his or her 
own cognitive abilities, they may discount information that does not match his or her beliefs. 
Even though heuristics may influence prediction and evaluation, it does appear that both healthy 
individuals and AD patients adjust their predictions after performing the same task several times 
(Ansell & Bucks, 2006).  
!
Anosognosia Studies in Huntington’s disease  
 
Metacognitive Knowledge of Behaviors 
Several studies have examined awareness of behavioral functioning in both prodromal 
and symptomatic HD patients. Most studies have used patient/informant discrepancy scores to 
determine unawareness of deficits in this population. In a study examining patient and informant 
agreement in prodromal HD patients, informants rated patients higher on all three subscales of 
the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe), which include Apathy, Disinhibition, and 
Executive Dysfunction when compared to gene negative at risk relatives.  Both patient and 
informant report were related to motor symptoms as rated on a neurologic exam. However, only 
informant ratings were related to neuropsychological test performance. The authors also reported 
that when closer to HD diagnosis, prodromal patients showed greater discrepancies from 
informant ratings on FrSBe scales, which was interpreted as possible decreased awareness 
associated with disease progression. However, for those patients closest to predicted conversion 
to manifest HD, patient and informant ratings eventually became more consistent. The authors 
suggested that those in the earlier prodromal phase might be able to detect prefrontal dysfunction 
better than informants. As these symptoms become more pronounced, however, informants may 
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be better able to identify these symptoms (Duff et al., 2010). A continuation of this pattern using 
the FrSBe has been found in manifest patients. One study found no discrepancies between 
patient and informant report for those patients with less motor symptom progression, while 
informants tended to rate patients as more severe on the measure for patients with more severe 
motor symptoms. Additionally, only informant ratings of executive dysfunction and apathy were 
related to the severity of motor symptoms while patient ratings were not related  (Hergert, 
Sanchez-Ramos, & Cimino, 2015). Another study that examined patient awareness in 
symptomatic HD patients found that when compared to informant ratings, patients overestimated 
their ratings of themselves in regards to behavioral and emotional control as well as their ability 
to manage activities of daily living. The most disagreement was found regarding emotional 
functioning. Furthermore, only informant ratings were associated with findings on the 
neurological exam. Interestingly, unawareness was associated with executive function and 
memory performance (Hoth et al., 2007).  
Chatterjee et al. (2005) found that agreement between HD patient and informant report of 
neuropsychiatric symptoms, such as depression, apathy, and irritability, depended on the level of 
cognitive impairment present, with lower agreement observed when patients had worsening 
cognition. In a study examining awareness of dysexecutive behavior in HD, patients were found 
to more accurately rate their caregivers dysexecutive behaviors than their own dysexecutive 
behaviors, suggesting that HD patients are generally able to report on these behaviors in other 
people, but may have limited awareness of their own behaviors (Ho et al., 2006). In another 
study comparing anosognosia in HD and Parkinson’s disease (PD), only informant report of 
dysexecutive behaviors was related to performance on tests of executive function for both HD 
patients and PD patients, though HD patients demonstrated more unawareness of executive 
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dysfunction than the PD patients (Sitek et al., 2013). Education has also been suggested to be 
associated with awareness in HD. One study showed that educated patients had an earlier age of 
onset, but had less severe symptoms. Authors have suggested more educated individuals may 
recognize symptoms earlier than those with less education (López‐Sendón et al., 2011).  
Two studies have examined awareness of memory deficits in HD. One study found that 
HD patients underestimate their memory functioning, as measured by patient-caregiver 
discrepancy scores, and that this underestimation of performance increases with disease 
progression as measured by the severity of motor symptoms. Both patient and informant report, 
however, were unrelated to memory performance on an objective memory measure (Sitek et al., 
2012). Another study that measured awareness by correlating self-report and objective memory 
performance found that patients earlier in the disease process were more accurate at evaluating 
their own memory than informants, while informant ratings were more accurate for patients later 
in the disease process (de Langavant et al., 2013). 
 
Online Awareness 
Online awareness is awareness of proficiency of performance before or after a task. 
Online awareness in HD has mainly focused on awareness of motor symptoms. In a study that 
used a videotaped interview to compare patient report to observed movements, anosognosia for 
chorea was observed in almost all participants. Controls were also interviewed in the same 
manner except the motor “symptoms” reported were normal involuntary movements such as 
twitches and postural changes. Results indicated that controls and prodromal HD patients were 
just as unaware of involuntary movements as early HD patients of their chorea, suggesting 
unawareness of movement observed in HD patients may not be pathological (Justo et al., 2013). 
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In another study of prodromal patients (PREDICT-HD data), 50% of patients who began to 
exhibit motor symptoms over the course of the study were unaware of their motor symptoms. 
Awareness was associated with increased depression (McCusker et al., 2013). HD patients have 
been shown to be less aware of involuntary movements than advanced PD patients (Sitek et al., 
2011). 
Limited research has been conducted examining metacognitive knowledge and online 
awareness in HD. Most studies suggest that awareness of cognition, behavioral and emotional 
functioning decreases as impairments in motor functioning and cognition increase. Furthermore, 
online awareness of motor symptoms has only been examined. Poorer self-awareness in HD may 
be related to a decline in orbitofrontal-limbic system functioning in HD, as HD patients may fail 
to attach a negative evaluation to impairments (Sitek et al., 2011). 
 
Anosognosia in Other Neurodegenerative Populations 
 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) 
Unawareness in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is nonspecific, as unawareness has been 
demonstrated across domains such as memory, executive functioning, language, and activities of 
daily living. Some have suggested that decline in memory abilities may be a contributor to 
unawareness in this population as patients are not able to remember new information about 
themselves (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009). In patients with probable AD, awareness of 
neurocognitive, behavioral and psychiatric disturbance predicted greater depressed mood and 
anxiety and less apathy while controlling for global cognition as measured by the Mini-Mental 
Status Exam (Horning, Melrose, & Sultzer, 2014). In a study examining the diagnostic 
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sensitivity of self and informant reports of cognition and cognitive testing in the prediction and 
detection of AD, informant report of current memory problems, changes in memory, and 
perceptions of the participant’s cognitive abilities were found to predict diagnosis, while self-
reports of the same information did not. This suggests that informants may be more accurate in 
describing patient behavior than AD patients themselves (Rabin et al., 2012).  
In a study of online awareness of memory performance, AD patients and controls were 
given three different word lists that they would need to remember. Before each trial, participants 
were asked how many words they would remember. While AD patients had larger discrepancies 
between their predictions and actual words they recalled than controls, the results suggested that 
AD patients were able to revise their predictions based on past experiences. The authors 
suggested that perhaps in AD, the comparator mechanism, which is controlled by executive 
functioning, is somewhat preserved. This hypothesis is congruent with the idea that executive 
functioning is relatively preserved in AD compared to subcortical dementias (Ansell & Bucks, 
2006). This is also supported by a more recent study that demonstrated AD patients were able to 
downgrade performance evaluation following a task when compared to their initial predictions, 
while frontotemporal dementia patients, a disease where executive dysfunction is more 
prominent, were less likely to downgrade performance (Williamson et al., 2009).  
In a study of AD patients, unawareness of cognitive deficits was related to more apathy, 
cognitive impairment, and delusions, and less depression. Unawareness of behavioral deficits, 
however, was not related to cognitive impairment but was related to disinhibition and 
pathological laughter. Apathy was found to be the main correlate of anosognosia, suggesting that 
unawareness of deficits is more closely related to emotional changes than it is to cognitive 
impairment (Landes et al., 2001; Starkstein, Sabe, Chemerinski, Jason, & Leiguarda, 1996).   
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Parkinson’s Disease (PD) 
Awareness in PD appears to be relatively preserved compared to other neurodegenerative 
populations as patients often report more impairments than informants. PD patients have been 
shown to report more executive dysfunction than healthy controls. Mild PD patients and 
caregivers had similar responses, indicating that patients have relatively good insight into their 
problems (Koerts et al., 2012). In another study, patient ratings indicated more impairment than 
informant ratings, except for apathy, which was the only area where patient and informant 
ratings were in agreement (McKinlay et al., 2008). Imaging studies in PD have suggested that in 
early PD, dopamine (DA) depletion is more severe in the putamen rather than the caudate. 
Furthermore, DA depletion is greatest in the rostrodorsal portion of the caudate, which is 
associated with connections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, areas associated with executive 
functions. Ventral regions of the caudate are connected to ventromedial portions of the prefrontal 
cortex, and functions of these areas, such as probabilistic learning, are often spared early in the 
disease (Cools, 2006; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001; Leh, Petrides, & Strafella, 
2010; Poletti & Bonuccelli, 2012). Perhaps awareness is relatively preserved in PD because the 
VMPFC is spared early in the disease.  
 
Frontotemporal Dementia (FTD)  
FTD is another disorder in which anosognosia is frequently observed. In a study 
examining different metacognitive and online awareness among the behavioral variant of FTD, 
corticobasal degeneration (CBD) and progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) patients, 
metacognitive awareness was examined using a patient-caregiver discrepancy on the Patient 
Competency Rating Scale (PCRS), a measure specific to awareness and a clinician interview of 
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awareness. Anticipatory awareness was measured by performance prediction on cognitive 
testing. Emergent awareness was measured using a Go/No-Go task where the participant had to 
acknowledge every time they made an error by saying “hit.” FTD, CBD, and PSP are frequently 
associated with abnormal tau protein and are all associated with atrophy of the frontal and/or 
temporal lobes. All three patient groups were impaired across all three types of awareness 
described in the model. They found that the FTD group, however, showed greater online 
emergent awareness impairment than the CBD and PSP groups, which the authors suggested 
may be related to more severe prefrontal cortex damage that is more commonly found in FTD 
compared to the other disorders (O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007). In another study, FTD patients 
showed greater behavioral unawareness than AD patients and healthy controls. FTD, AD, and 
control group performance prediction ratings were positively correlated to performance.  When 
examining FTD subtypes, however, behavioral subtype (social dysexecutive) patients had 
difficulty predicting performance on a word memory task, while those with progressive non-
fluent aphasia had difficulty predicting verbal association fluency performance (Eslinger et al., 
2005). In a study examining awareness of cognition in AD and the behavioral variant of FTD 
patients, both groups showed an impaired feeling of knowing accuracy compared to controls and 
the severity of impairment was greater for the FTD group. Past research suggests a strong link 
between prefrontal cortex functioning and feeling of knowing ability.  Additionally, FTD 
patients did not adjust performance predictions when provided feedback, which the authors noted 
is consistent with past findings that FTD patients are insensitive to negative feedback (Rosen et 
al., 2014). This supports the idea that anosognosia in FTD is related to a failure in online 
monitoring.  
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Summary of Anosognosia in Neurodegenerative Disorders 
In the neurologic patient populations described above, including HD, changes in 
awareness are associated with cognitive and emotional factors. When comparing patient groups, 
it appears that patients with more significant executive functioning (e.g. FTD) and memory (e.g. 
AD) impairments tend to demonstrate more severe symptoms of unawareness. In Parkinson’s 
disease, awareness appears to be relatively spared, especially earlier in the disease progression, 
which may be due to the sparing of the VMPFC. Across disorders, patients with apathy tend to 
have higher rates of unawareness, suggesting a connection between awareness and emotional and 
motivational factors.  
 
Rationale of the Current Study 
 
Clinical Implications of Anosognosia in HD 
Anosognosia is important to study in HD because it has several implications for the 
clinical care of patients as well as our understanding of anosognosia more generally. Studying 
unawareness of executive dysfunction may be particularly valuable, as behavioral executive 
function is associated with overall functioning in instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADLs)(Karzmark, Llanes, Tan, Deutsch, & Zeifert, 2012). Several studies have demonstrated 
that in different neurologic patient populations, anosognosia can impact the quality of life of the 
patient and caregiver (Rymer et al., 2002). For example, anosognosia in AD patients is related to 
less patient depression and reported better quality of life. However, it is also related to greater 
caregiver burden and greater discrepancies between patient and caregiver quality of life (Conde-
Sala et al., 2013). In a study of TBI patients and their caregivers, caregiver distress was 
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significantly correlated with caregiver perception of patient unawareness (Prigatano, Borgaro, 
Baker, & Wethe, 2005). Additionally, anosognosia may inflict a financial burden on families for 
patients who need supervision because they are at risk for wandering or engaging in other risky 
behaviors such as driving (Rosen, 2011).  
In HD specifically, unawareness can delay diagnosis and/or become a barrier to treatment 
(e.g. swallowing evaluations, obtaining proper walking aids). Unawareness may cause conflict 
within families between those who may be unaware and do not want to know their genetic status 
versus family members who do want to know their genetic status. Furthermore, for those who are 
still employed or still engaging in other instrumental activities of daily living such as driving, 
unawareness of certain cognitive and functional limitations may compromise the safety of the 
patient and others who may be impacted by the patient’s actions.  Additionally, it is important to 
understand who retains awareness, as those individuals are at increased risk for depression, 
anxiety, and suicide (McCusker & Loy, 2014).  
 
Examining the Relationship Among Anosognosia and Cognitive and Mood Factors 
In most theoretical models, anosognosia is theorized to be a multifaceted construct that is 
associated with deficits in many brain regions and cognitive domains. Most models of 
anosognosia in the context of neurodegenerative diseases suggest that there are relationships 
between awareness and executive functioning, emotion, and memory (Clare et al., 2011; 
Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Rosen, 2011).  
Executive Functioning.  Executive functioning is an umbrella term that describes 
purposeful, goal-directed behavior (Banich, 2009) or mental operations that are needed in novel 
or in non-routine situations, in which there is not an established stimulus-response association 
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(Gilbert & Burgess, 2008).!As described in several of the models above, executive functioning 
appears to be an essential component in self-monitoring, self-evaluating and the organization and 
retrieval of relevant autobiographical memories (Morris & Mograbi, 2013; Robertson, 2010). 
Due to executive functional impairments that often observed in both prodromal and symptomatic 
stages of the disease, it is likely that prefrontal dysfunction through degeneration of frontal-
striatal pathways plays a role in anosognosia (McCusker & Loy, 2014; Sitek et al., 2014).  
Emotion. Several models of awareness suggest emotional factors are important 
contributors to anosognosia because emotion impacts the salience of stimuli. The more salient 
the stimulus, the more likely one will remember it and refer to it later (Mograbi & Morris, 2014; 
Rosen, 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Anosognosia has been shown to be a predictor of severe 
apathy (Starkstein, Brockman, Bruce, & Petracca, 2010). Apathy has been defined as lack of 
motivation, which cannot be attributed to emotional distress, cognitive deficits, or loss of 
consciousness (Marin, 1991). 
Apathy may be implicated in awareness in HD. Apathy is a common frontally mediated 
behavioral disturbance in HD, with studies reporting that between 32-50% of patients experience 
some degree of symptoms (Hamilton et al., 2003; Naarding & Janzing, 2003; Paulsen, Ready, 
Hamilton, Mega, & Cummings, 2001; Van Duijn et al., 2010). The anterior cingulate cortex has 
been implicated in unawareness, error monitoring, and apathy (Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, & 
Falkenstein, 2006; Landes et al., 2001; Lavretsky, Ballmaier, Pham, Toga, & Kumar, 2007; 
Tekin & Cummings, 2002). This structure is impacted in HD through degeneration of projections 
from the striatum (Beste et al., 2006).  
Preservation of awareness does seem to be a risk factor for developing depression. In AD, 
more depression is associated with less anosognosia (Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Starkstein et al., 
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1996; Verhey, Rozendaal, Ponds, & Jolles, 1993). In schizophrenia, those with preserved 
awareness after the first psychotic episode are more likely to develop depression and commit 
suicide four years after the episode (Crumlish et al., 2005). According to the Beck model of 
depression, patients view themselves, their current situation, and their future situation negatively 
(Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Some have suggested that depression is associated with less 
anosognosia due to a negative bias when reporting on problems related to symptoms. Another 
suggestion is that increased awareness of difficulties may lead to reactive depression, suggesting 
a protective role of anosognosia (Mograbi & Morris, 2014).  
Memory. Finally, while memory appears to be an essential aspect of the development of 
the sense of self, it is unclear if changes in memory functioning significantly contribute to the 
development of anosognosia in HD. Some memory deficits are observed in HD but are often 
related to a decline in executive functioning as opposed to a true deficit in the ability to encode 
and retain memories. Memory retrieval is often impaired, but performance often improves when 
HD patients are provided information in a recognition format or when cued (Lezak, Howieson, 
Bigler, & Tranel, 2012). Hoth et al. (2007) reported that overall memory performance on the 
Dementia Rating Scale – 2 (DRS-2) was associated with unawareness in HD. It is unclear, 
however, which aspect of memory functioning may be contributing to unawareness and therefore 
a more comprehensive measure of memory is needed to examine how memory relates to 
unawareness in this population. Specifically, it remains unclear if there is an actual deficit in a 
specific aspect of memory (e.g. encoding, storage) that is associated with unawareness in HD, or 
if the memory problems are actually due to executive dysfunction resulting in a retrieval issue.  
Studying how executive dysfunction, emotion/motivation, and memory are related to 
anosognosia can inform which factors most strongly contribute to unawareness in HD. 
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Additionally, this will allow for the examination of which model of anosognosia may best fit the 
pattern of unawareness observed in HD.  
 
Rationale for Methods 
Using Discrepancy Scores to Measure Metacognitive Awareness. Informant or 
collateral report is one of several sources of information used in clinical decision-making for the 
HD population. Patient/informant discrepancy scores have been used to measure metacognitive 
knowledge, or one’s overall knowledge of oneself or one’s condition (O'Keeffe, Dockree, 
Moloney, Carton, & Robertson, 2007; O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). It 
has been suggested that discrepancy scores may be a suitable method to measure unawareness in 
HD. When HD patients report on another person’s behavior, agreement between the patient and 
that person is high. However, when patients’ ratings of their own functioning and behavior are 
compared to informant report, the discrepancies between the reports are larger, suggesting more 
disagreement. This suggests that discrepancies between patient and informant ratings may 
indicate a decrease in self-awareness (Ho et al., 2006; Hoth et al., 2007).  
Using Performance Prediction and Evaluation to Measure Online Awareness. 
Measuring two types of anosognosia (i.e. Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness) may 
provide more information about this multifaceted construct, as different factors (i.e. Executive 
Dysfunction, Apathy, and Memory) may be related to these types of awareness in a different 
fashion. A performance prediction and evaluation paradigm was included in the study to further 
examine HD patient awareness of performance on specific tasks. The performance prediction 
and evaluation technique is thought to allow for the measurement of Online Awareness from the 
Toglia and Kirk Model (Banks & Weintraub, 2008; O'Keeffe, Dockree, et al., 2007; O'Keeffe, 
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Murray, et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2010; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Specifically, performance 
prediction is thought to measure Anticipatory Awareness, while performance evaluation is 
thought to be a measure of error monitoring or Emergent Awareness (Banks & Weintraub, 
2008). Several research groups have used performance prediction and evaluation methods with 
other neurodegenerative populations. This technique, however, has yet to be used in HD patients 
except for studies of motor awareness, which indicated that patients were unaware of their 
movements (Justo et al., 2013). 
To obtain performance prediction and evaluation estimates, a method of asking 
participants to rate their performance on a bell curve was used. The bell curve method is 
advantageous over other performance prediction and evaluation methods because predictions, 
evaluations, and test scores will be on the same scale (i.e. percentiles) and are therefore more 
easily compared. The bell curve method has been used in performance prediction and evaluation 
studies in AD and FTD patients (Rosen et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 2009).  
Some have suggested performance prediction may be more difficult for tasks that are not 
generally engaged during everyday functioning (Williamson et al., 2009). Because of the specific 
interest in examining Online Awareness of executive functioning and memory, participants 
predicted and evaluated their performance on the Everyday Functioning Executive Function and 
Memory subtests from the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery (NAB) The tasks were 
chosen as more ecologically valid measures of executive functioning and memory because the 
tasks were created to reflect tasks that may be encountered in everyday life (e.g. driving, 
remembering medication instructions).  These tasks have been used in a performance prediction 
and evaluation study of Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia patients (Williamson 
et al., 2009). 
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Purpose of the Current Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine how cognitive (i.e. Executive Functioning and 
Memory) and emotional factors (i.e. Apathy) contribute to Metacognitive Knowledge and Online 
Awareness in symptomatic HD. Metacognitive Awareness of Executive Dysfunction, Memory, 
and Apathy and Online Awareness of Executive Dysfunction and Memory were examined.   
 
Main Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis One - Metacognitive Knowledge  
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning, Apathy, 
and Memory as measured by informant and patient discrepancies on self - report measures. (2) 
Executive Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Metacognition Knowledge, 
while Apathy will have a negative association. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be 
more strongly related to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory.  
 
Hypothesis Two - Anticipatory Awareness 
 (1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory 
as measured by performance prediction on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive 
Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness while 
Apathy will be negatively associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will have stronger 
relationships with Anticipatory Awareness than Memory.  
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Hypothesis Three - Emergent Awareness  
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Emergent Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory as 
measured by performance evaluation on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive 
Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with awareness while Apathy will be 
negatively associated.  (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be greater contributing factors 
to Emergent Awareness in HD than Memory.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesis One. 
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Figure 2. Hypothesis Two.  
 
Figure 3. Hypothesis Three.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
Sixty-one patients with a diagnosis of Huntington’s disease were recruited from the 
Huntington’s Disease Society of America’s (HDSA) Center of Excellence Clinic at the 
University of South Florida and signed informed consent. One additional patient was recruited 
but did not have the capacity to provide informed consent and was not enrolled in the study. Five 
participants who signed consent did not complete the study (one due to a history of head injury, 
three did not want to complete the cognitive testing, and one had difficulty understanding how to 
complete the self-report questionnaires). All five of these participants had informants who signed 
consent for the study and completed the informant questionnaires in person, but the informant 
data was not used in the final data analysis.  
Participant Characteristics – Huntington’s Disease Patients 
Fifty-six Huntington’s disease patients completed the study. In the final sample, there 
were 20 males (35.7%) and 36 females (64.3%), ages ranged from 33-72 (M=52.71, SD=10.97), 
and years of education ranged from 9-19 (M=13.86, SD=2.3). All participants identified 
themselves as Caucasian. One participant identified as Hispanic/Latino(a), while 55 participants 
identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino(a).  
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Participant Inclusion Criteria. Participants were required 1) to be 18 years and older 
and 2) have been diagnosed with manifest Huntington's disease. The HD diagnosis was defined 
as ever having a rating of a “4” on the Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale (UHDRS) 
Diagnostic Confidence Interval (“motor abnormalities that are unequivocal signs of HD (≥ 99% 
confidence)” and either had genetic testing with a positive result for the expanded CAG repeat or 
a family history of HD with clinical confirmation by a movement disorder specialist. It was also 
preferred that the participant had an informant who was willing to participate in the study.  
Participant Exclusion Criteria. Individuals were excluded who 1) had a diagnosis of 
another neurologic disorder other than HD, 2) were unable to complete questionnaires either due 
to difficulties with reading the English language or significant impairment that hindered the 
ability to complete the study protocol (i.e. in the advanced stage of dementia), or 3) were unable 
to provide informed consent to be part of the study. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) was used to help determine whether or not an individual had the cognitive ability to 
provide informed consent for the study. Karlawish et al. (2013) reported that a score of 22 on the 
MoCA provided good sensitivity (94%) in detecting Parkinson’s patients deemed not capable of 
providing consent (Karlawish et al., 2013). Therefore, individuals with scores ≥22 were 
considered capable of providing consent for the study. For those who scored less than 22, the 
capacity to consent was determined by a health care professional on the study team. These 
potential participants had to demonstrate that they understood what was explained to them in the 
consent form by explaining key points of the study related procedures and that they understood 
the risks and benefits of the study. Additionally, they needed to demonstrate that they understood 
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that their decision to participate in the study was voluntary and they needed to explain why they 
would like to participate.  
 
Participant Characteristics – Informants 
In the final sample, 55 of the 56 participants identified informants. If more than one 
caregiver or informant was identified and wanted to participate, the informant who spent the 
most time with the patient was asked to participate.  Forty-one informants completed the study 
procedures in person and nine completed the procedures through Qualtrics Survey Software, a 
secure, online survey website. Five identified informants did not complete the survey. In the final 
sample of 50 informants, there were 24 males (48%) and 26 females (52%), ages ranged from 
18-72 (M=52.24, SD=14.44), and years of education ranged from 10-20 (M=14.24, SD=2.68). 
There were no differences in age or education between the patient or informant groups (See 
Table 1). 
One informant identified as African American, one identified as mixed race, and 48 
identified as Caucasian. One informant identified as Hispanic/Latino(a), while 49 participants 
identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino(a). Informants were asked if they themselves were at risk of 
developing Huntington’s disease. When multiple informants were available, informants who had 
no family history of HD were preferred. Forty-three informants were not at risk because they 
were unrelated to the patient (i.e. they had no family history of HD). Five informants were at 
risk, meaning that they have a family history of HD, but were never tested for the gene. One 
informant was gene-negative, meaning she had a family history of HD but had a negative genetic 
test result. One informant had presymptomatic HD, meaning the informant tested positive for the 
HD gene but had not yet developed manifest HD. The informants had the following relationships 
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to the patients: 27 spouses, 7 children, 6 parents, 3 non-married significant others, 2 siblings, 2 
ex-spouses, and 2 nieces, 1 friend. Informants knew the patients for an average of 29 years 
(SD=14.68; Range: 1 year – 66 years). Informants were also asked to rate how well they knew 
the information on a Likert scale based on the one used in Hoth et al., 2007 (See Table 2).  
 
Table 1. Comparison between patient and informant demographic information. 
Demographic:  Patient  Informant Difference 
Age Mean: 52.71 (10.97) Mean: 52.24 (14.44) Not 
Significant 
Education Mean: 13.86 (2.3) Mean: 14.24 (2.68) Not 
Significant 
Gender 20 Male / 36 Female 24 Male / 26 Female  
Ethnicity 
 
1 Hispanic/Latino(a) 
55 Non-Hispanic/Latino(a) 
1 Hispanic/Latino(a) 
49 Non-Hispanic/Latino(a) 
 
Race 56 Caucasian 1 African American 
1 Mixed 
48 Caucasian 
 
HD 
Categorization 
56 Symptomatic HD 43 Not at risk, No family hx 
5 At Risk, family hx 
1 Tested gene negative 
1 Presymptomatic HD, gene + 
 
 
 
Table 2. Relationship Quality Based on Informant Report. 
Quality of Knowing the Patient Number (%) of 
informants 
providing rating 
Very Well 46 (92%) 
Pretty Well 3 (6%) 
Fairly Well 1 (2%) 
Not So Well 0  
Hardly At All 0 
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Informant Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria. Informants must have 1) been 18 years or 
older, 2) not have been diagnosed with manifest HD, 3) been capable of providing written, 
informed consent, 4) must not have been diagnosed with a disorder that is associated with 
cognitive impairment, 5) had the ability to understand and read English, and 6) if not present at 
the appointment, must had been able to access questionnaires online and fill out the 
questionnaires prior to or following the patient’s visit.  
 
Participant Recruitment 
HD patients who met the inclusion criteria and also provided consent to be a part of the 
USF Huntington’s Disease Research Registry (IRB # Pro00010382) or part of the multi-site 
Enroll-HD study were identified and contacted via phone to gauge interest in participation in the 
study. Participants were able to complete study procedures before or following their regular 
clinic visit with their neurologist or before or following another study (i.e. Enroll-HD). (See 
Figure 4 and Table 3). Patients who were not enrolled in the registry or the Enroll-HD study 
were approached by their HD neurologist, Juan Sanchez-Ramos, Ph.D., M.D. during their clinic 
visit. If the patient was willing to hear more about the study, study staff explained the study to 
them by verbally going through the consent. Staff obtained written consent if the patient and 
informant were interested in participating. This discussion took place in a private room.  
 
Table 3.  Patient Recruitment Information for Final Sample. 
Recruitment Source Number of Enrolled Participants 
Recruited From Source 
Enroll – HD Study 37 (66%) 
USF HD Research Registry 6 (11%) 
Neurology Clinic 13 (23%) 
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Figure 4. Recruitment Flow-Chart.  
~170 names obtained in registry, Enroll-HD and Clinic Appointments 
86 patients were identified as possible candidates for the study 
Reached 83 patients via phone or during their clinic visit 
19 declined 
participation  
1 no-showed  
2 excluded 
(presymptomatic, severe 
cognitive impairment) 
62 were interested in participating 1 excluded (did not have capacity 
to consent) 
61 signed consent 5 excluded following consent  
-1 due to history of severe TBI 
-3 refused cognitive testing 
-1 could not complete 
questionnaires 
 
56 completed the study 
55 Identified Informants 
41 informants 
completed in 
person 
9 informants completed 
via Qualtrics 
5 informants 
could not be 
reached 
Data was analyzed for 56 
patients and 50 informants 
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Measures 
Self-Report Measures 
The Frontal Systems Behavior Scale; Self and Family Rating Forms (After-Illness Ratings) were 
used to assess patient and informants’ perception of current frontally mediated behaviors of the 
patient to assess Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Executive Dysfunction. It is a 46-item 
questionnaire with subscales that assess Apathy, Disinhibition, and Executive Dysfunction. 
Patients and informants rated frontally mediated behaviors on a five-point scale (1=almost never 
to 5=almost always). T-scores greater than 65 indicate clinical significance. It has been shown to 
have adequate internal reliability for Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.88)  and Apathy (Cronbach’s 
α =.72), Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.75), and Executive dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.79) 
subscales. Adequate internal reliability has also been found for the Family Form Total score  
(Cronbach’s α =.92) and Apathy (Cronbach’s α =.78), Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.80), and 
Executive dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.87) subscales. The FrSBe has been shown to have good 
convergent validity with the Neuropsychiatric Inventory. Additionally, FrSBe Family Ratings 
have been used to discriminate between frontally mediated behavioral syndromes in AD and HD 
(Stout, Ready, Grace, Malloy, & Paulsen, 2003).  For the current study, the measure also had 
adequate internal reliability for patient Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.919), Apathy (Cronbach’s α 
=.816) Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.79), and Executive Dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.815). 
There was adequate consistency for the informant Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.929), Apathy 
(Cronbach’s α =.845), Disinhibition, (Cronbach’s α =.847), and Executive Dysfunction 
(Cronbach’s α =.875).  
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Everyday Memory Questionnaire- Revised (Patient and Informant forms) is a 13-item measure of 
memory failures in everyday life and was used to measure Metacognitive Knowledge of 
memory. The 13-item version has two main factors: retrieval and attentional tracking. The 
measure has been shown to have strong internal reliability (Cronbach’s α =.89) and good 
discrimination between clinical and control groups (Royle & Lincoln, 2008). This measure has 
previously been used to examine awareness of memory functioning in Parkinson’s patients 
(Mack et al., 2013). In this sample, there was adequate internal consistency for both the self-
report form (Cronbach’s α =.939) and the informant-report form (Cronbach’s α =.934).  
 
Caregiver Appraisal Scale (Informant Report Only) is a 28-item questionnaire using a 5-point 
Likert Scale that assesses four dimensions of caregiving. Adequate reliability has been found for 
each subscale: caregiving satisfaction (Cronbach’s α =.87-.77), caregiving mastery (Cronbach’s 
α =.73-.52), impact of caregiving (Cronbach’s α =.78-.77), and subjective caregiving burden 
(Cronbach’s α =.91-.89) (Lawton, Moss, Hoffman, & Perkinson, 2000; Struchen, Atchison, 
Roebuck, Caroselli, & Sander, 2002). Concurrent validity has been demonstrated, as scores on 
this measure are correlated with other caregiver burden measures. This scale has been used in 
HD research (Pickett Jr, Altmaier, & Paulsen, 2007). The caregiving burden subscale was used to 
control for caregiver burden. In this sample, there was adequate internal consistency for the 
caregiver burden subscale (Cronbach’s α =.874).  
 
Clinician Administered Measures 
Apathy Evaluation Scale - Clinician Version (AES-C) is an 18-item clinician administered semi-
structured interview of global Apathy. Subscales include cognitive, behavioral, and emotional 
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Apathy. Internal reliability has been shown to be adequate (Cronbach’s α =.86-.94). Test-retest 
reliability varies from r=.76 to .94. Convergent had been established. The relationship between 
clinician report and self-report is r=.72, p<.001 and clinician and informant report is r=.62, 
p<.001. The measure has been shown to discriminate from clinician-rated depression, r= .39, 
p<.001 and clinician-rated anxiety, r=.35, p<.01 (Marin, Biedrzycki, & Firinciogullari, 1991). 
This measure was used as a predictor variable of awareness. In this sample, there was adequate 
internal consistency for the total score (Cronbach’s α =.905).  
 
Huntington’s Disease Diagnostic and Neurologic Measures 
Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale – Motor Scale is a 15-item neurological movement 
scale administered by a movement disorder specialist with high ratings indicating greater 
severity of motor symptoms. High internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =.95)  and 
intercorrelations between domains of the UHDRS have been found. It has also high interrater 
reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient =.94 for total motor score) (Kremer & Huntington 
Study Group, 1996). This measure was used to control for disease progression.  
  
Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale – Diagnostic Confidence Interval is a confidence 
interval rating given by a trained movement disorder specialist that indicates the level of 
certainty that the motor abnormalities observed during the motor exam are signs of Huntington’s 
disease. Ratings range from 0-4, with 0 being normal, to 4 (motor abnormalities that are 
unequivocal signs of HD (≥ 99% confidence) (Kremer & Huntington Study Group, 1996). This 
measure was used to determine eligibility for this study. Only those who ever had a rating of a 4 
were eligible to participate in the study.   
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Cognitive Measures 
Screening Measure. Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) is a cognitive screening 
measure that examines different areas of cognitive function (i.e. executive function, language, 
visuospatial, memory, attention, and orientation) that is used to detect cognitive impairment. The 
MoCA is scored on a 30-point scale, with a score of 26 or above indicating normal performance. 
The MoCA will be used to determine global cognitive impairment. Test-retest reliability has 
been reported to be r=.92 and has adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =.83). In this 
sample, internal consistency was adequate (Cronbach’s α =.768). Convergent validity has been 
demonstrated with a high correlation (r=.87) between the MoCA and the Mini-Mental Status 
Exam (MMSE), another cognitive screening assessment (Hoops et al., 2009; Lezak et al., 2012; 
Nazem et al., 2009). It has been suggested that for HD, the MoCA may be a more sensitive 
screening tool than the MMSE because the MoCA is better suited to capture certain cognitive 
functions, such as executive functioning (Mickes et al., 2010; Videnovic et al., 2010). This 
measure was used to describe the severity of cognitive impairment of the sample and was used to 
determine whether or not an individual had the cognitive ability to provide informed consent for 
the study.  
Executive Functioning Tasks. Executive Abilities: Measures and Instruments for 
Neurobehavioral Evaluation and Research (EXAMINER) - Unstructured Task is a measure of 
planning, value-based decision-making, self-regulation, and self –monitoring. This measure was 
used as a predictor variable (Executive Functioning). The examinee is given three booklets with 
five pages of simple puzzles that take between 4-60 seconds to complete. Each puzzle is worth a 
different amount of points. Participants have six minutes to earn as many points as possible. 
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Puzzles have different cost-benefit ratios. Test-retest reliability has been demonstrated to be 
r=.71. It has been shown to be correlated with FrSBe scores (r=.29) and separates patients from 
controls (F=11.2, p<.005) (NIH EXAMINER Manual). The task performance has been shown to 
be associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage (Robinson, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss, 
& Tranel, 2014). The EXAMINER battery has been validated in several neuropsychiatric 
populations (Kramer et al., 2014). This battery has shown to be sensitive in HD patients (You et 
al., 2014).  
 
Stroop Test (Golden Version, 1976) is a test of inhibition and was used as a predictor variable 
(Executive Functioning). Participants are given color words that are printed in different color ink 
and are required to state the color of the ink in which the word is printed. The test takes 
advantage of the differences in cognitive processing of words versus color identification, with 
word reading being considered more of an automatic process. This causes interference when 
trying to name the color of the ink the word is printed in and the prepotent response of reading 
needs to be inhibited (Golden & Freshwater, 1978; Lezak et al., 2012). Test-retest reliability has 
been reported as r=.86 (Word), r=.82 (color), and r=+.73 (Word-Color). The Stroop task has 
been shown to have convergent validity with tasks of inhibition and processing speed, has been 
shown to have predictive validity of functional status in a follow-up study of vascular dementia 
patients (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  
Trail Making A & B (TMT) is a task involving scanning and visuomotor tracking, divided 
attention and cognitive flexibility and will be used as a predictor variable (executive 
functioning). For Part A, participants draw lines to connect numbered circles in consecutive 
order as fast as possible. Part B requires participants to connect circles with numbers and letters 
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by alternating between the two types of sets in consecutive order (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). 
Test-retest reliability for part A has been shown to range from r= .46-.89 and .44-.87 for part B. 
Interrater reliability has been reported to be .94 for part A and .90 for Part B (Fals-Stewart, 
1992{Strauss, 2006 #316).TMT has demonstrated validity, with significant relationships 
between it and performance on several other executive function tasks of attention and set-shifting 
(Strauss et al., 2006). The test has also been shown to be sensitive to individuals with brain 
damage (Reitan, 1958).  
Memory Task. Hopkins Verbal Learning Test – Revised (HVLT-R) is an auditory verbal 
learning task where examinees are required to learn a list of items drawn from three semantic 
categories. This test was used as a memory predictor variable of awareness. The task involves 
immediate free recall, delayed free recall, and recognition trials. Test-retest reliability has been 
shown to range from r=.74 for total recall, r=.66 for delayed recall, r=.39 for retention, and .r=4 
for recognition discrimination. Convergent Validity studies indicate that total recall has been 
shown to be correlated with the Wechsler Memory Scale, Logical Memory I (r=.75), and delayed 
recall was associated with Logical memory II (r=.77). HVLT-R Retention score was related to 
Logical Memory Savings score (Logical memory II divided by Logical Memory I) (r=.65). The 
task has also been shown to adequately discriminate between AD and normal geriatric 
individuals. Total recall in AD patients resulted in 95% sensitivity and 83% specificity. In VaD a 
linear combination of total recall resulted in 85% correct classification (Brandt & Benedict, 
2001).  
Anticipatory and Emergent Awareness Tasks. Neuropsychological Assessment Battery 
(NAB) Daily Living Tests (Stern & White, 2003) were developed to be highly congruent with 
analogous real-world behavior and were developed to have stronger ecological validity than 
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other clinical neuropsychological test measures. The following NAB tasks were used in this 
study: 
• Driving Scenes Subtest (Attention Module) is a test where the examinee is shown a series 
of six driving scenes from behind the steering wheel of a car and needs to indicate which 
details have changed. The task is associated with visuospatial abilities, working memory, 
visual scanning, attention to detail, and selective attention. The Driving Scenes test has 
been shown to be related to an on-road driving test (r= .55, p<.01) in healthy controls and 
mild dementia patients, providing some evidence for the ecological validity of the 
measure  (Brown et al., 2005). The Driving Scenes subtest is also related to the WMS-III 
Digit Span Total (r=.32), Letter-Number Sequencing (r=.29), Mental Control (r=.32), and 
Working Memory (r=.39).  
• Daily Living Memory (Memory Module) is a task of learning, storage, and free recall of 
information encountered during everyday functioning. There are two subtasks. The first 
is the Medication Instructions task, where examinees are presented with instructions for 
taking medications that they need to remember. The second is the Name, Address, and 
Phone Number task, where the examinee is to remember these pieces of information. The 
subtest shows moderate correlations with criterion measures of visual and verbal 
memory. The retention score is associated with CVLT-II Trials 1-5 total (r=.44) and long 
delay free recall (r=.44). The recognition score is associated with CVLT-II Long Delay 
Recognition (r=.39). 
• Judgment (Executive Functioning Module) is a task that asks examinees questions 
pertaining to health and safety issues and is associated with problem-solving and 
knowledge of safety. White and Stern (2003) indicated that judgment is associated with 
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dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex and connections to subcortical brain regions. Internal 
consistency reliability of the measure has been demonstrated (Cronbach’s α=.83) 
(MacDougall & Mansbach, 2013). The Judgment subtest is associated with TMT-B score 
(r=.3) and Verbal Fluency (r=.46) in a non-impaired sample (Stern & White, 2003).  
 
Procedures 
 
Patients Recruited from the Neurology Clinic or HD Research Registry 
Patients who were recruited from the clinic were asked if the data from the Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) and the Unified Huntington’s Disease rating Scale Motor Exam 
could be used for the study, as these procedures are typically completed during the course of the 
patients’ regular visit. Motor score data were used if the motor exam was completed within one 
year of the rest of the study procedures, as motor scores have been shown to significantly 
increase by 6 points after a one year period (Siesling, van Vugt, Zwinderman, Kieburtz, & Roos, 
1998). MoCA scores were used if completed within one month of the rest of the study 
procedures. Nasreddine et al. (2005) have demonstrated high test-retest reliability for the MoCA 
(r=.92, p<.001) after one month in healthy controls, mild cognitive impairment and AD patients, 
with a 0.9 point change in score on average. Additionally, participants were asked for the 
following demographic information: race, ethnicity, age, gender, highest level of education, age 
of diagnosis, and onset of motor symptoms and CAG repeat number on the larger allele. 
Information about current medications that may influence the motor score was obtained (e.g 
Xenazine/Tetrabenazine, Risperdal/Risperidone). Patients were asked if their medications have 
changed if they had completed their clinic visit on a different day than the study procedures. See 
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Some information was obtained from the patients’ medical records if available. Appendix C for 
detailed demographic information.  
 
Participants Who Also Participated in Enroll-HD 
Participants in the Enroll-HD study were asked if the information collected for the 
Enroll-HD study could be used for this study. This information included demographics, motor 
exam scores, CAG repeats, medications and cognitive test data (i.e. Trail Making Test). Patients 
were asked if their medications had changed if they had completed their Enroll-HD visit on a 
different day. Motor score data was used if the motor exam was completed within one year of the 
rest of the study procedures. Trail Making Test scores were used if completed within one month 
of the rest of the study procedures. A study in normal controls indicated no significant change in 
Trail Making Test scores in a one year period (Basso, Bornstein, & Lang, 1999).  
 
Study Procedures for All Participants 
Patient procedures. Once enrolled, the participant completed the FrSBe Self-Rating 
Form (current ratings only) and the Everyday Memory Questionnaire-Revised. Trained study 
staff administered the AES-C to obtain clinician ratings of Apathy. The trained study staff 
member also administered the cognitive tests in a counterbalanced order (See Appendix A). The 
order of whether the participant completed the questionnaires or cognitive tests first was also 
counterbalanced. Participants used a bell curve from the EXAMINER Battery to examine 
Anticipatory and Emergent awareness of performance on the NAB tasks. Convergent validity 
has been demonstrated for bell curve methods in dementia populations; high correlations (above 
r=.8) have been found when comparing verbal prediction ratings and predictions using bell curve 
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ratings (Williamson et al., 2009). Before and after each NAB task, the participant was asked to 
evaluate his or her performance by indicating whether he or she was “above average, average, or 
below average” compared to healthy individuals without Huntington’s disease and who were the 
same gender, age, and education.  The participant then had to indicate where he or she performed 
on the bell curve. Please refer to Appendix A for the full script that was used.  
Informant procedures. If the informant was present at the study appointment, the 
patient and informant were separated to ensure the independence of the report. The study staff 
reinforced that all data collected was kept confidential. Informants were given a short 
questionnaire to obtain demographic information (age, education, gender, ethnicity, personal HD 
status) and about their relation to the patient. These questions are similar to what was used for 
another study of patient and informant agreement in HD patients (Hoth, 2005; Hoth et al., 2007). 
See Appendix B for Informant Demographic Questionnaire. The informant completed the 
following questionnaires: FrSBe-After Illness Ratings (Family Rating Form), Memory Abilities 
Questionnaire (Informant Rating Form), and the Caregiver Appraisal Form. Informants who 
completed the online survey signed the consent form electronically. After completion of the 
study, all participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  
Confidentiality procedures. Participants were informed that data that was collected was 
for study purposes and did not have their names or other identifying information associated with 
it. Only the consent forms contained names. Potential participants were told that their 
participation in this research was voluntary and the decision to participate would not affect their 
treatment that they received at the University of South Florida.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
RESULTS 
 
 Data were analyzed using IBM SPSS 24.0 for Mac, MPLUS Version 7.2, and SAS 9.4. 
Please view Appendix D for general data diagnostic information.  
 
Hypothesis One - Metacognitive Knowledge  
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning, Apathy, 
and Memory as measured by informant and patient discrepancies on self - report measures. (2) 
Executive Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Metacognition Knowledge, 
while Apathy will have a negative association. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be 
more strongly related to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory.  
 
 Main Proposed Analysis for Hypothesis One 
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework in MPLUS 
7.2 was used to determine if cognitive Executive Functioning, Memory performance, and 
clinician-rated Apathy independently predicted Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, Executive 
Dysfunction, and Memory. The benefit of using this approach was to compare relationships 
across the individual regression analyses. Multiple imputation was used to maximize the data set 
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(see Appendix D). Metacognitive Knowledge scores for Apathy and Executive Dysfunction were 
calculated by subtracting the norm corrected-informant ratings from the norm-corrected patient 
ratings of the FrSBe Apathy and Executive Dysfunction subscales. Metacognitive Knowledge 
scores for Memory were calculated by separately adding items from the EMQ-R self and 
informant reports to create two separate total scores and then subtracting informant scores from 
patient scores. Five informants had missing items on the EMQ-R and their final scores were 
prorated. Correlations among predictor and outcome variables were explored. Please view 
Appendix E for results of correlational analyses.  
In the multivariate multiple regression model, the Unstructured Task Standard Score, 
Stroop Interference score, the HVLT-R Recognition Memory raw score, and the AES-C total 
score were added to the model as the predictors. TMT scores were removed from all analyses to 
improve power because it was unrelated to any awareness variable in the correlational analyses.  
The original intended analysis was to complete a principle components analysis of the TMT-B/A 
Ratio Adjusted score, Stroop Interference Standard Score, and the Unstructured Task Total 
Points standard score to create a latent executive function variable. This variable was to be used 
in the multivariate multiple regression analysis for the purpose of improving power. However, 
the assumptions for PCA or creation of a composite score were not met because the three 
variables did not have significant relationships with one another.  
The following variables were added to control for demographic and disease 
characteristics: age, education, gender, UHDRS motor score, and Subjective Caregiver Burden 
subscale score from the Caregiver Appraisal Scale. The outcome variables (Metacognitive 
Knowledge) were the Apathy (FrSBe), Executive Dysfunction (FrSBe), and Memory (EMQ-R) 
! 49 
discrepancy scores. Scores were converted to z-scores so all variables would be on the same 
scale. 
Examination of assumptions for regression for Hypothesis One. Tests of multivariate 
normality suggested the residuals for the model did not statistically deviate from multivariate 
normality, B1p=0.76, X2(10)=6.81, p=0.74, B2p=13.64, zupper=-1.24 zlower=-1.63. One data point 
was identified as a multivariate outlier (Mahalanobis Distance=11.78; p<.01). The removal of 
this data point did not change the results, so it was included in the final analysis. Assumptions 
were also examined for each OLS regression model. Examination of scatterplots of the 
standardized residuals, the standardized predicted values, and histogram plots of residuals 
suggested that the assumptions of random errors, homoscedasticity, and linearity were met. The 
Watson and Durbin test indicated that residuals were independent (values=2.12, 2.14). 
Guidelines by Field (2009) were used to examine data points that may be outliers or unduly 
influential to the model. There were no Cook’s d values greater than 1, nor were there any data 
points with large leverage values. No data points were considered to be casewise outliers (+/- 
2SD from the mean). However, three participants had large Mahalanobis distance values (>15). 
Data analysis was completed with and without these participants to determine if their inclusion in 
the analysis significantly changed the results. One participant’s data changed several predictors 
from non-significant to significant when the data was included in the model. Therefore, it 
appears that this one participant seems to be influencing the model’s results and was removed 
from the final analysis. The other two participants’ inclusion or exclusion did not change the 
results, therefore, they were included in the model to maximize the dataset. The results are 
reported with 48 patient/informant pairs (Table 4).    
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Examination of VIF and Tolerance values did not reveal serious problems with 
multicollinearity, however, there were potential issues with multicollinearity for the Unstructured 
Task total points standard score (VIF=2.6, Tol=.38) and UHDRS Total Motor Score (VIF=3.4, 
Tol=.297). The Unstructured Task score and UHDRS Motor Score total were highly correlated 
(r=-.689, p<.001).  One method for handling multicollinearity is to remove one of the variables 
that are problematic (Field, 2009). Given that the Unstructured Task total points score is one of 
the main variables of interest, it was not ideal to remove it from the model. A hierarchical 
regression approach for each outcome variable (Apathy discrepancy, Executive discrepancy, and 
Memory discrepancy scores) was used to determine if motor scores explained significant 
additional variance above and beyond the other variables in each of the OLS models as well as to 
examine if the inclusion or exclusion of motor scores changed the results. Motor scores did not 
explain additional variance in any of the individual OLS models (See Table 20 in Appendix E). 
The Unstructured Task is a written task and is likely dependent on motor functioning, which may 
explain the multicollinearity. Regardless, results presented include motor scores to continue to 
have a representation of disease progression in the model. R2 were provided for each individual 
regression model: Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, R2 = .411, p<.001; Metacognitive 
Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction, R2 =.328, p<.01, and Metacognitive Knowledge of 
Memory, R2 = .286, p<.05. See Table 3 and Figure 10 for results. Results of the model without 
motor scores are provided in Appendix E.  
Hypothesis One: Metacognitive Knowledge regression results. The Chi-square test of 
model fit indicated that the saturated model fit significantly better than the model with regression 
coefficients constrained to 0 for the model with motor scores, χ2 (27)=52.614, p<.01.  
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Table 4.  Metacognitive Analysis with motor scores (48 participants). 
 Apathy Awareness Executive Awareness Memory Awareness 
Est. SE St. Est Est. SE St. Est Est. SE St. 
Est. 
Uns. Task 0.343 0.227 0.270 0.413+ 0.247 0.319+ 0.128 0.265 0.1 
Stroop Int.  0.487* 0.215 0.316* 0.137 0.234 0.087 0.036 0.251 0.02 
AES-C 0.260* 0.131 0.265* 0.226 0.143 0.226 0.103 0.153 0.1 
HVLT-R -0.218 0.137 -0.232       -0.347* 0.149 -0.362* -0.36* 0.160 -0.4* 
Age -0.002 0.012 -0.020       -0.023+ 0.013 -0.266+ -0.03+ 0.014 -0.3+ 
Gender -0.55* 0.257 -0.28* 0.069 0.280 0.035 0.018 0.300 0.01 
Education 0.06 0.055 0.141 0.007 0.060 0.015 0.076 0.065 0.17 
CB -0.24+ 0.139 -0.25+ -0.279+ 0.151 -0.284+ -0.41* 0.162 -0.4*       
UHDRS  -0.07 0.193 -0.08 -0.084 0.210 -0.086 0.02 0.23 0.02 
Main Predictors are italicized; * p<.05; + p<.1; Uns. Task = Unstructured Task Total Points 
Standard Score; Stroop Int.=Stroop Interference Scores; HVLT-R=HVLT-R Recognition Scores; 
CB= Caregiver Burden; UHDRS=UHDRS Motor scores 
 
Metacognitive Knowledge: Apathy. There were positive relationships of the 
Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy with both the Stroop interference score (positive 
relationship predicated) and AES-C total score (negative relationship predicted). The 
Unstructured Task total scores coefficient was no longer significant when motor scores were 
included in the model. The coefficients for the Stroop and AES-C were not significantly different 
from each other, Wald Test χ2 (1)=0.774, p=0.38.  
Metacognitive Knowledge: Executive Dysfunction.  The HVLT-R was negatively 
associated with the discrepancy score for Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction 
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(positive association predicted). There was a trending, positive relationship between the 
Metacognitive Knowledge Executive Dysfunction score and the Unstructured Task (positive 
relationship predicated).  
Metacognitive Knowledge: Memory.  The Metacognitive Knowledge Memory score was 
only associated with the HVLT-R (negative relationship) recognition predictor variable (positive 
relationship was predicted).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Multivariate Multiple Regression Results.  
Black indicates significant path, Blue indicates non-significant path. Standardized coefficients 
are reported in the figures. 
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 Exploratory Analyses of Metacognitive Knowledge 
In examining the results of the multivariate multiple regression, it appears that the 
statistic was underpowered as several variables that were not significant in the simple 
correlational analyses (See Appendix E) became significant in the regression, indicating possible 
suppressor effects. Another difficulty is in the interpretation of difference scores in the regression 
analysis. When examining individuals’ difference scores, negative scores indicate that the 
informant rated the symptom more severely than the patient. Positive difference scores indicate 
that the patient rated the symptom more severely than the informant. Because of this, a positive 
relationship between the discrepancy scores and cognition does not necessarily indicate better 
cognition with better awareness, nor does a negative relationship indicate worse awareness with 
worse cognition (or the opposite with Apathy). For example, a positive relationship between the 
Stroop and Awareness of Apathy does not necessarily indicate that better awareness is associated 
with Stroop performance. It could alternatively indicate that for those with high informant ratings 
(negative difference scores), better Stroop scores could indicate better awareness. However, 
those with high patient ratings, the patients with the best Stroop performance are actually 
overestimating their symptom severity relative to the informant.  There may also be a 
relationship only when informants are rating the patient more severely, but not when the patients 
are providing more severe ratings. While the correlational analyses can be further examined via 
scatter plot to determine the nature of these relationships, significant regression coefficients 
indicate that there is some kind of relationship between the variables, but the nature of the 
relationship is difficult to determine. 
Given the null correlational results and use of difference scores, the regression is difficult 
to interpret. Addition analyses were conducted to explore Metacognitive Knowledge in 
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Huntington’s disease to circumvent this issue with difference scores. These analyses provided 
interesting results that align with the expected hypotheses and past work in this area.  
  Exploratory analysis: Comparing patient and informant ratings (49 participants). 
Mean Apathy outcome (Patient: M=71.67, SD=19.15; Informant: M=87.96, SD=19.36) and 
Executive Dysfunction outcome (Patient: M=73.8, SD=17.35; Informant: M=75.67, SD=15.99) 
group scores based on FrSBe subscales were above clinical cut-offs (T=65) for both patient and 
informant ratings. The mean patient EMQ-R score was 24.16 (16.23), while the mean informant 
EMQ-R score was 20.7 (13.96). Paired t-tests were used to examine if there were mean 
differences in ratings of Apathy, Executive Dysfunction, and Memory between patient and 
informant groups. The mean Apathy informant rating was significantly higher than the mean 
patient Apathy rating, t(48)=5.35, p<.001. There were no significant mean differences between 
patient and informant ratings of Executive Dysfunction or Memory.  
Further analysis was completed to determine if the differences between patient and 
informant report varied as a function of symptom severity. Splitting the sample based on motor 
score severity was initially considered given motor scores could represent disease severity. 
However, 48% of the patients were on medication to control movements, which could impact 
their motor scores. Therefore, one set of analyses was conducted using informant ratings to split 
the sample and a second set of analyses was conducted using the MoCA scores to split the 
sample based on overall cognitive functioning.  
Informant ratings for Apathy, Executive Dysfunction and Memory were divided into 
tertiles. The bottom tertile represented lower informant rated symptom severity while the top 
represented the highest informant rated symptom severity. Differences between patient and 
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informant ratings were analyzed across these tertiles using a 2 (patient/informant report) X 3 
(tertiles 1 through 3) mixed model analysis of variance. 
Apathy. The results revealed a two-way interaction between type of report and group, 
F(2, 46) = 11.36, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 46)= 19.2, p<.001 and report 
type F(1, 46)=42.53, p<.001. In post-hoc analysis, there was no significant difference between 
the patient and informants for the lowest Apathy group, however, informants rated Apathy 
significantly higher than the patients for the middle t(15) = 4.786, p<. 001 and most severe 
groups t(15)=6.192, p<.001 (See Figure 6). Differences in predictor variable values were 
examined between top and bottom groups using independent samples t-tests.  There was a 
significant difference between total AES-C scores t(21)=2.18, p<.05 with the bottom group 
(lowest Apathy) (M=42.24, SD=12.89) having lower clinician rated Apathy than the top group 
(highest Apathy) (M=50.88, SD=9.51). There was also a significant difference in Stroop 
performance t(31)=2.3, p<.05, with the top group (highest Apathy) (M=46.31, SD=3.07) 
performing worse than the bottom group (lowest Apathy) (M=50.29, SD=6.22). 
Executive Dysfunction. The results revealed a two-way interaction between type of report 
and tertile group, F(2, 46) = 9.06, p<.001, with a main effect for tertile group, F(2, 46)= 16.28, 
p<.001. Post-hoc analysis revealed that for the lowest informant-rated symptom group – patients 
rated their Executive Dysfunction more severely than the informants t(15)=2.522, p<.05. The 
middle tertile group was in agreement. For the top group (highest Executive Dysfunction), 
informants provided more severe ratings compared to the patients t(18)= 3.08, p<.01 (See Figure 
7). When examining differences in predictor variables between the top and bottom groups, the 
top group (most informant-rated Executive Dysfunction) performed significantly worse on TMT-
B, t(33)=2.3, p<.05 (T-scores Top M=19.86, SD=9.31; Bottom M=35.68, SD=17) and the 
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Unstructured Task t(33)=2.1, p<.05 (z-scores Top M=-1.71, SD=.57; Bottom M=-1.25, SD=.75). 
There was significantly lower Apathy for the bottom group t(33)=2.73, p<.01 (top: M=48.21, 
SD=7.97; bottom: M=39.31, SD=11.29). 
Memory. The results revealed a significant two-way interaction between report type and 
tertile group, F(2, 47)= 11.82, p<.001 with a significant main effects for tertile group, F(2, 
47)=15.17, p<.001. Patient ratings were significantly higher than informant ratings for the 
bottom group (lowest informant-rated memory issues), t(14)=4.96, p<.001 and middle groups, 
t(17)=2.03, p<.05, while informant ratings were higher than the patients’ in the top group 
(highest informant-rated memory issues), t(16)=2.317, p<.05 (See Figure 8). When comparing 
predictor variables between top and bottom groups, the top group demonstrated poorer 
performance on the Stroop, t(30)=3.3, p<.01 (top – M=44.94, SD=4.99; bottom - M=51.72, 
SD=6.54) and had significantly worse clinician rated Apathy (AES-C), t(30)=2.86, p<.01 (top -  
M=48.47, SD=11.46; bottom -  M=37.73, SD=9.56).  
 
 
Figure 6. Mean informant and patient ratings of Apathy based on informant rating tertiles. 
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Figure 7. Mean informant and patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction based on informant 
rating tertiles.  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean informant and patient ratings of Memory based on informant rating tertiles. 
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Exploratory analysis: Examining patient and informant agreement based on overall 
cognitive impairment using the MoCA. The sample was split into thirds based on MoCA 
Standard Scores. The Top group had the highest (best) MoCA standard scores (N=16; Mean: 
.5887, SD=.42), while the bottom group had the lowest (worst) scores (N=13; Mean=-2.36, 
SD=.8).  
For Apathy ratings, there were significant differences in informant and patient ratings for 
the bottom two thirds of the sample (bottom, t(15)=7.533, p<.001, middle, t(19)=2.369, p<.05). 
There was no difference between patient and informant ratings of Apathy for the best MoCA 
performers (See Table 5 and Figure 9).   There were no significant differences for any of the 
tertile groups between patient and informant report for Executive Dysfunction (See Figure 10). 
There were no significant differences for any of the tertile groups between patient and informant 
report for memory (See Figure 11). 
 
Table 5. Apathy ratings for groups based on MoCA scores.  
 Bottom 
t(15)=7.533, p<.001 
Middle 
t(19)=2.369, p<.05 
Top 
ns 
Patient Mean 64.38 (SD=16.63) 78 (SD=17.04) 70.92 (SD=22.87) 
Informant Mean 92.38 (SD=13.09) 89.65 (SD=23.1) 79.92 (SD=18.42) 
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Figure 9. Informant and patient ratings of Apathy based on patient performance on the MoCA. 
 
 
Figure 10. Informant and patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction based on patient performance 
on the MoCA. 
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Figure 11. Informant and patient ratings of Memory based on patient performance on the 
MoCA. 
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memory performance on cognitive testing. Informant report of the patients’ Memory was only 
negatively associated with delayed memory. Informant report of the patients’ Executive 
Dysfunction was negatively associated with performance on executive function tasks (i.e., 
Unstructured Task, Trail Making Test, and Stroop Test) while there was no association between 
patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction and executive function performance (See Table 6). 
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Additionally, when examining patient and informant report of Apathy, only informant report was 
related to cognitive performance on executive functioning tasks (TMT-B standard score (r=-.322, 
p<.05); Stroop CW Standard (r=-.351, p<.05).   
 
Table 6. The Relationship Between Patient and Informant Reports and Neuropsychological Test 
Results. 
Memory – Everyday Memory Questionnaire 
Neuropsych Task Patient Report Informant Report 
HVLT-R Immediate Trials ns ns 
HVLT-R Delay r=-.292, p<.05 (Raw) 
r=-.311, p<.05 (T Score) 
r=-.26, p=.066 (Raw) 
r=-.29, p<.05 (T Score) 
HVLT-R Recognition r=-.459, p<.001 (Raw) 
r=-408, p<.01 (T Score) 
ns 
Percent Retention r=-.289, p<.05 (Raw) 
r=-.398, p<.01 (T Score) 
ns (Raw) 
r=-.27, p=.06 (T Score) 
Executive Function- FrSBe Executive Dysfunction Subscale 
Neuropsych Task Patient Report Informant Report 
Unstructured Task Points (z) ns r=-.328, p=.05 
Stroop Color-Word  ns r=-.475, p<.001 
Stroop Interference ns r=-.346, p=.05 
TMT B Time ns r=-.361, p<.05 
TMT B Standard Score r=-.321, p<.05 r=-.426, p<.01 
TMT B-A (z) ns r=-.26, p=.071 
TMT B/A Ratio (z) ns ns 
Apathy – FrSBe Apathy Subscale 
Neuropsych Task Patient Report Informant Report 
Stroop Color-Word ns r=-.351, p<.05 
TMT B Standard Score ns r=-.322, p<.05 
ns=not significant; standard scores reported except where indicated; z=z-score. 
 
Hypothesis Two - Anticipatory Awareness 
 (1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory 
as measured by performance prediction on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive 
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Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness while 
Apathy will be negatively associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will have stronger 
relationships with Anticipatory Awareness than Memory.  
 
Validity Check for Performance Prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and  
Evaluation (Emergent Awareness) Rating Method 
To demonstrate that patients’ ratings on the bell curve were consistent with their beliefs 
(i.e Anticipatory and Emergent Awareness), patients were asked to provide a verbal indicator of 
their performance (i.e. average, above average, or below average) in addition to a percentile 
rating.  
 
Table 7. Kendall’s Tau Correlations: Verbal statement of ratings and percentile ratings using the 
bell curve method. 
NAB Task Performance Prediction 
Rating /Anticipatory 
Awareness 
Performance Evaluation 
Rating/ Emergent 
Awareness 
Driving .847** .743** 
Judgment .765** .793** 
Medication 
Immediate Memory 
 
Delay Memory 
 
Recognition Memory 
 
.756** 
 
.731** 
 
.773** 
 
.660** 
 
.704** 
 
.802** 
Address  
Immediate Memory 
 
Delay Memory 
 
Recognition Memory 
 
.799** 
 
.717** 
 
.797** 
 
.679** 
 
.687** 
 
.834** 
** indicates p<.0001 
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Patients’ verbal ratings of their performance were strongly correlated with their percentile 
ratings for all NAB tasks, suggesting that patient’s ratings were consistent with their beliefs of 
performance (see Table 7).  
 
Main Proposed Analysis for Hypothesis Two 
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework was used to 
explore the hypothesis. The outcome variables were the memory and executive function 
Anticipatory Awareness factor scores which were calculated by subtracting the patient ratings 
from the actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask (See Appendix F for 
information on the creation of factor scores). The Unstructured Task total points, Stroop 
Interference score, HVLT-R Recognition Score and AES-C score were the predictor variables. 
The regression analysis controlled for age, education, gender, and UHDRS motor score. 
Correlations between predictor and outcome variables were analyzed (See Appendix F for a full 
report of correlational analyses).  
Regression assumptions and diagnostics. Tests of multivariate normality suggested that 
the residuals for the model did not statistically deviate from multivariate normality, B1p=1.87, 
X2(20)=18.18, p=0.58, B2p=24.81, zupper=.43, zlower=-0.74. One multivariate outlier was 
identified. Regression assumptions were also examined for each OLS regression model. 
Examination of scatterplots of the standardized residuals and the standardized predicted values 
suggested that the assumptions of random errors and linearity were met. The Watson and Durbin 
test indicated that residuals were independent (values=2.12, 2.14). Examination of a histogram of 
the residuals indicated that the residuals were normally distributed, however, an issue related to 
homoscedasticity was noted for a few data points. Examination of influential data points revealed 
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large Mahalanobis distance values (>15) for three cases across all 4 OLS regressions. Upon 
removal of these cases, scatterplots of the standardized residuals appeared to be a random pattern 
of points, suggesting the data met the homogeneity of variance assumption for each separate 
OLS model. Additionally, three casewise outliers were identified. Data changed significantly 
upon removal of 4 out of the 6 participants that were identified to be casewise outliers or had 
large Mahalanobis distance values, suggesting they potentially influenced results. Results were 
therefore examined with 51 out of the 55 participants who had data. Similar to the Metacognitive 
Knowledge analyses, a potential issue with multicollinearity between the Unstructured Task total 
points and UHDRS Motor score was identified (Unstructured Task: Tolerance=.4, VIF=2.49; 
Motor Scores: Tolerance =.36, VIF=2.77). Because inclusion or exclusion of UHDRS motor 
scores did not change the results of the regression analysis, results with the inclusion of the 
UHDRS motor scores are reported. 
Anticipatory Awareness: Regression results (51 participants). The Chi-square test of 
model fit indicated that the saturated model fit significantly better than the model with regression 
coefficients constrained to 0, χ2 (32)=56.599, p<.01. R2 were provided for each individual 
regression model for each outcome variable (the Anticipatory Awareness Factor Scores): 
Executive Prediction R2=.183 p=.065; Immediate memory prediction R2=.195, p=.052, Delay 
Memory Prediction R2=.327, p<.01; Recognition Memory R2= .257, p<.05. There was a 
trending, positive relationship with the Executive Anticipatory Awareness Factor Score and the 
AES-C, and a significant, positive relationship with the HVLT-R recognition score. The 
Immediate Memory Prediction score had a positive relationship with the AES-C and a negative 
relationship with the Unstructured Task score.  
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There was a trending relationship with the Delay Memory Prediction score and the Stroop 
Interference score. See Table 8 and Figure 12 for the complete results.  
 
Table 8. Multivariate Multiple Regression for Memory and Executive Anticipatory Awareness 
(Performance Predictions). 
 Executive 
Prediction 
Immediate Memory 
Prediction 
Delay Memory 
Prediction 
Recognition Memory 
Prediction 
 Est SE St. Est SE St.  Est SE St Est. SE St. 
Uns 0.3 0.3 0.21 -0.7 0.28 -0.56 -0.2 0.271 -0.12 -0.09 0.281 -0.07 
Stroop -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.13 0.24 0.083 0.4+ 0.232 0.2+ 0.096 0.242 0.06 
AES 0.3+ 0.1 0.3+ 0.28 0.14 0.276 0.19 0.135 0.18 0.214 0.140 0.2 
HVLT 0.5 0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.23 -0.088 -0.2 0.222 -0.22 -0.17 0.224 -0.17 
Gender 0.2 0.2 0.16 -0.2 0.33 -0.112 -0.2 0.316 -0.07 -0.21 0.326 -0.10 
Motor 0.5+ 0.3 0.5+ -0.5+ 0.29 -0.51+ -0.7 0.277 -0.64 -0.43 0.289 -0.42 
Edu. 0.3+ 0.2 0.26
+ 
0.14 0.06 0.333 -0.1 0.061 -0.21 0.008 0.063 0.02 
Age -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.03+ 0.02 0.303+ 0.05 0.014 0.57 0.05 0.015 0.53 
Italicized are main DVs, Bolded indicates significance p>05, + indicates trending, Uns= 
Unstructured Task total points, Edu=Education 
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Figure 12. Model for Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Anticipatory 
Awareness/Performance Prediction.  
 
Black indicates significant path, Blue indicates non-significant path. Standardized coefficients 
are reported in the figures. 
 
Hypothesis Three - Emergent Awareness 
 (1) Cognitive Executive functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will 
be independently associated with Emergent Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory as 
Not!significant!
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measured by performance evaluation on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive functioning 
and Memory will be positively associated with awareness while Apathy will be negatively 
associated.  (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be greater contributing factors to 
Emergent Awareness in HD than Memory.  
 
Main Proposed Analyses of Hypothesis Three 
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework was used to 
explore the hypothesis. The outcome variables were the immediate, delay, and recognition 
memory and executive function evaluation factor scores which were calculated by subtracting 
the patient ratings from the actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask. The 
Unstructured Task total points, Stroop interference score, HVLT-R Recognition Score and AES-
C score were the predictor variables. The regression model controlled for age, education, gender, 
and UHDRS motor score.  
Regression assumptions and diagnostics. Tests of multivariate normality suggests the 
residuals for the model do statistically deviate from multivariate normality B1p=2.14, 
X2(20)=20.74, p=0.43, B2p=23.23, zupper=-.41, zlower=-1.57. One multivariate outlier was 
identified. Examination of a histogram of the residuals indicated that the residuals are normally 
distributed. Examination of scatter plots of residuals indicated that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity has been met. Examination of influential data points revealed large 
Mahalanobis distance values for three cases across all 4 OLS regressions. One of these data 
points was the same point identified as a multivariate outlier. Additionally, seven casewise 
outliers were identified across the OLS regressions. The results did not change with the removal 
of these individuals from the data set. Data is reported with all data points included. Similar to 
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the previous analyses, a potential issue with multicollinearity between the Unstructured Task 
total points and UHDRS Motor score was identified (Unstructured Task: Tolerance=.4, 
VIF=2.49; Motor scores Tolerance =.36, VIF=2.77). Because the inclusion or exclusion of 
UHDRS Motor scores did not change the results of the regression analysis, results with the 
inclusion of the UHDRS Motor scores are reported, especially since UHDRS Motor scores were 
a significant predictor for some of the outcome variables. The Durbin-Watson statistic (values 
range from 2.09-2.28), which tests the independence of errors assumption, was in the acceptable 
range. 
 
Table 9. Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Emergent Awareness (45 Participants). 
 Executive 
Evaluation 
Immediate Memory 
Evaluation 
Delay Memory 
Evaluation 
Recognition Memory 
Evaluation 
    Est SE St.  Est SE St Est. SE St. 
Uns.    -0.341 0.257 -0.256 -0.242 0.236 -0.183 -0.136 0.239 -0.1 
Stroop    -0.169 0.239 -0.103 0.120 0.219 0.074 0.117 0.223 0.07 
AES-C    0.311* 0.134 0.30* 0.172 0.123 0.166 0.382* 0.125 0.4* 
HVLTR    0.147 0.168 0.138 -0.132 0.156 -0.125 -0.083 0.156 -0.1 
Gender    -0.042 0.062 0.084 -0.261 0.261 -0.128 0.318 0.266 0.15 
Total Motor    -0.279 0.196 -0.279 -0.48* 0.183 -0.48* -0.319     0.183 -0.3 
Education    0.173 0.285 -0.098 -0.10+ 0.057 -0.2+ 0.059 1.025 0.13 
Age    0.015 0.013 0.168 0.043* 0.012 0.48* 0.043* 0.012 0.5* 
Italicized are main DVs, Bolded indicates significance p>05, + indicates trending 
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Emergent Awareness/Performance Evaluation: Regression results. The Chi-square 
test of model fit indicated that the saturated model did significantly fit better than the model with 
regression coefficients constrained to 0, χ2 (32)=49.278, p<.05. R2 were provided for each 
individual regression model: Executive Evaluation, R2= not significant. Immediate Memory 
R2=.178, p=.057; Delay Memory R2=.309, p<.01; Recognition Memory R2=.287, p<.01. 
Regarding the primary predictors, only the AES-C had positive relationships with the Immediate 
and Recognition Memory Evaluation discrepancy scores. When regression was attempted with 
Driving or Judgment Emergent Awareness score alone rather than combined into a factor score, 
neither of those regressions were significant. See Table 9 and Figure 13 for complete results.  
 
Figure 13. Model for Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Emergent Awareness/ 
Performance Evaluation. 
Not significant 
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Exploratory Analyses for Online Awareness 
Similar to Hypothesis 1, the proposed analyses to test the Online Awareness Hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 2 and 3) was to use a multivariate multiple regression approach. Initial correlational 
analyses, however, did not reveal any convincing relationships among the predictor and outcome 
variables. The multivariate multiple regression was underpowered and suppression effects also 
arose, making the regression analysis difficult to interpret. Furthermore, difference scores make 
it difficult to interpret the nature of the relationships observed. Additional analyses were 
conducted to further explore Online Awareness in HD.    
 
Exploratory analysis: Relationships between patient ratings and actual 
performance. Patients’ predictions of executive performance (i.e. Judgment and Driving tasks) 
were unrelated to actual performance, while memory predictions (i.e. Medication and Address 
Memory) were related to performance (Anticipatory Awareness). Memory evaluation was more 
strongly associated with performance than executive function evaluation (Emergent Awareness) 
(see Table 10).   
Exploratory analysis: Differences between Prediction ratings (Anticipatory 
Awareness), Evaluation ratings (Emergent Awareness) and actual performance. 
Paired-samples t-tests were used to examine if there were mean differences in performance on 
the NAB memory and executive function tasks and the patients’ performance prediction ratings 
for the tasks. For all NAB tasks, mean predictions were significantly higher than actual 
performance (all differences p<.001).  
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Table 10. Relationship between performance prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and 
evaluation (Emergent Awareness) percentile ratings and actual performance. 
NAB Task: Performance 
Prediction  
Performance Evaluation 
Judgment  ns 
 
ns 
 
Driving  ns 
 
ns 
 
Medication Memory Immediate ns 
 
r=.415, p<.01 
 
Medication Memory Delay r=.274, p<.05 
 
r=.337, p<.05 
 
Medication Memory Recognition r=.257, p=.058 
 
r=.288, p<.05 
 
Address Memory Immediate ns 
 
r=.552, p<.001 
 
Address Memory Delayed r=.512, p<.001 r=.594, p<.001 
Address Memory Recognition 
 
r=.338, p<.05 
 
r=.452, p<.001 
 
 
 
When examining differences between performance prediction and evaluation ratings, on average, 
participants’ evaluations of performance were higher than their predictions for the Judgment, 
Driving and Address Memory Recognition tasks. Their evaluations were lower for the 
Medication Immediate Memory and Medication Memory Recognition Tasks (See Figure 14). 
Exploratory analyses were conducted to examine differences among actual performance 
and predictions and evaluations. Participants were separated into tertile groups based on actual 
performance. The Bottom group represented the worst performers, while the Top group 
represented the best performers. Differences were analyzed across these tertiles using a 3 (Score: 
actual performance, prediction rating, and evaluation rating) X 3 (Tertiles: 1 through 3) mixed 
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model analysis of variance with special attention to interaction effects to determine if differences 
in discrepancies between performance and ratings depended on how well individuals performed 
on the task. Afterward, additional exploratory analyses were conducted to examine group 
differences in discrepancy scores between prediction scores (Anticipatory Awareness) and actual 
performance. The procedure was also completed for evaluation scores (Emergent Awareness). 
This method has been used to examine the Dunning-Kruger effect to examine if low performers 
are worse at predicting performance than high performers (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & 
Kruger, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Given the exploratory nature of this analysis only 
differences between the bottom and top tertiles were explored to reduce the number of 
comparisons made. 
 
 
Figure 14. Performance Prediction and Evaluation Ratings and Actual Performance.  
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NAB Judgment. The results revealed a two-way interaction between score and group, F(4, 
104) = 15.7, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 18.41, p<.001 and report type 
F(2, 104)=28.74, p<.001. Analyses of discrepancies between actual performance and ratings 
revealed significant differences in prediction discrepancies, (Top M=15.22, SD=22; Bottom M=-
34.6, SD=25.1), t(34)=6.32, p<.001  and evaluation discrepancies, (Top M=22.6, SD=19.9; 
Bottom M=-37.37, SD=28.1)  t(34)=7.381, p<.001 between top and bottom groups. The top-
performing group underestimated their performance while the bottom group overestimated 
performance (See Figure 15). There were no differences in predictor variable scores between the 
top and bottom groups.  
 
 
Figure 15. Patient ratings of Judgment and actual performance by tertile group based on actual 
performance.  
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NAB Driving. The results revealed a two-way interaction between score and group, F(4, 
102) = 3.12, p< .05, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 4.28, p<.05 and score F(2, 
102)=72.23, p<.001. 
There were significant differences between the top and bottom performing groups for 
both prediction discrepancies t(39)=2.82, p<.01 and evaluation discrepancies t(39)=2.32, p<.05. 
Both groups overestimated their performance, but there were larger discrepancies between 
patient ratings and their actual performance for the lowest performers compared with the top 
performers (Prediction Means: Top M=-14.9, SD=28.1; Bottom M=-37.2, SD=22.7) (Evaluation 
Means: Top M=-25.47, SD=19.8) (See Figure 16). When examining mean group differences 
between top and bottom performers, the top performers also had significantly better HVLT-R 
Recognition scores, (Top M=8.89, SD=2.4; Bottom M=5.14, SD=2.23), t(39)=5.192, p<.001, 
TMT-B Standard Scores, (Top M=37.6, SD=12.9; Bottom M=21.74, SD=11.28), t(39)=4.2, 
p<.001, Unstructured Task Scores, (Top M=-1, SD=.78; Bottom M=-1.8, SD=.53), t(39)=3.9, 
p<.001, and significantly lower Apathy (AES-C), (Top M=42.2, SD=12.75; Bottom M=50.64, 
SD=7.4), t(39)=2.32, p<.05.  
NAB Immediate Memory Medications. The results revealed a two-way interaction 
between score and group, F(4, 102) = 6.88, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 
12.97, p<.001 and score F(2, 102)=21.7, p<.001.However, there were no significant differences 
in performance prediction or evaluation discrepancy scores between the top and bottom 
performing groups.  
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Figure 16. Patient ratings of Driving and actual performance by tertile group based on actual 
performance.  
 
NAB Delay Memory Medications. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any 
interaction effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 12.39, p<.001 and score 
F(2, 102)=21, p<.001. There were no significant differences between the lower and upper tertile 
groups for prediction or evaluation discrepancy scores of delay memory for medications.  
NAB Recognition Memory Medications. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any 
interaction effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 11.14, p<.001 and score 
F(2, 104)=42.85, p<.001. 
There was no significant difference in tertile groups for prediction or evaluation 
discrepancy ratings of recognition memory for medications.   
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NAB Immediate Memory Address. The results revealed a two-way interaction between 
score and group, F(4, 104) = 6.38, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 14.25, 
p<.001 and score F(2, 104)=19.76, p<.001. 
There was a difference in discrepancy scores for prediction of immediate memory 
(address) between top (M=-6.9, SD=18.2) and bottom performing groups (M=-10.5, SD=16.3), 
t(33)=2.74, p<.01 with a larger overestimations of performance by the bottom performing group 
(See Figure 17). There was no significant difference for evaluation discrepancies. Regarding 
differences in predictors between the top and bottom groups, there top group had significantly 
better performance on TMT-B Standard Scores, (Top M=35, SD=9.8; Bottom M=21.3, SD=15), 
t(33)=3.268, p<.01, HVLT-R Recognition scores, (Top M=8.3, SD=2.9; Bottom M=5.9, 
SD=2.7), t(33)=2.5, p<.05, Stroop Interference, (Top M=50.7, SD=5; Bottom M=46.5, SD=4.9), 
t(33)=2.49, p<.05, and Unstructured Task, (Top M=-1, SD=.77; Bottom M=-1.7, SD=.68), 
t(33)=2.83, p<.01.  
 
 
Figure 17. Patient ratings of Immediate Memory for Address and actual performance by tertile 
group based on actual performance.  
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Bottom Second Third 
Pe
rc
en
til
e 
Actual Performance Tertile 
Immediate Memory - Address 
Actual Score 
Predicted Rating 
Evaluation Rating 
! 77 
 
NAB Delay Memory Address. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any interaction 
effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 31.88, p<.001 and score F(2, 
102)=18.55, p<.001. 
There were no differences in delay memory (address) prediction or evaluation discrepancies 
between the upper and lower tertile groups.  
NAB Recognition Memory Address. The results revealed a two-way interaction between 
score and group, F(4, 104) = 2.61, p< .05, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 17.79, 
p<.001 and score F(2, 104)=49.8, p<.001. 
There was a significant difference in prediction discrepancies between top and bottom 
performing groups, with the bottom (M=-35.22, SD=24) group providing a larger overestimation 
of performance than the top group (M=-11.65, SD=22.6), t(36)=3.1, p<.01. There was no 
difference in evaluation discrepancy scores (See Figure 18). There were also significant 
differences in predictor variables with the top performance group also performing better on the 
HVLT-R Recognition scores, (Top M=9.4, SD=1.8; Bottom M=5.2, SD=3.2), t(36)=5.12, 
p<.001, TMT-B Standard Score, (Top M=35.5, SD=13.2; Bottom M=20.2, SD=10.4), 
t(36)=3.95, p<.001, and the Unstructured task, (Top M=-1, SD=.79; Bottom M=-1.9, SD=.46), 
t(36)=4.05, p<.001.  
 
Exploratory Analysis: Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness   
There were no relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge discrepancy scores (FrSBe and 
EMQ-R) and Online Awareness discrepancy scores.  
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Figure 18. Patient ratings of Recognition Memory for Address and actual performance by tertile 
group based on actual performance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore cognitive (i.e. Executive Functioning and 
Memory) and emotional factors (i.e. Apathy) and their relationships with Metacognitive 
Knowledge and Online Awareness in symptomatic HD. Metacognitive Awareness of Apathy, 
Executive Dysfunction, and Memory and Online Awareness of Executive Dysfunction and 
Memory were specifically examined. This was an exploratory study; there have been no other 
studies to date that examined factors that may be associated with the development of 
unawareness in Huntington’s disease. It was also unclear from previous research if unawareness, 
or anosognosia, is global or domain-specific in this population. It is also the first known study in 
HD to examine Online Awareness using a performance prediction and evaluation technique in 
addition to self/informant report discrepancies to study Metacognitive Knowledge.  
 
Metacognitive Knowledge in HD  
Metacognitive Knowledge is the overall beliefs about one’s own abilities or self (Toglia 
& Kirk, 2000).  Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, Executive Dysfunction, and Memory was 
measured with discrepancies between patient and informant report in these domains. It was 
hypothesized that Apathy, Executive Functioning, and Memory would independently be related 
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to Metacognitive Knowledge. Apathy and Executive Functioning would be more strongly related 
to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory (Hypothesis One).  
The proposed analysis to test this hypothesis was to use a multivariate multiple regression 
approach to examine these relationships. Initial simple correlational analyses of the 
Metacognitive Knowledge difference score outcome variables and the predictor variables 
revealed some relationships including Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and self-monitoring 
(Unstructured Task) and inhibition (Stroop Interference) as well as a relationship between 
Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction and inhibition (Stroop Interference). 
Graphical exploration of these findings indicated that a few participants’ scores drove the Stroop 
relationships, so it may not be appropriate to draw conclusions about these relationships. The 
relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and the Unstructured Task score 
suggests that initially, as performance on the Unstructured Task improves, informants and 
patients are in better agreement. However, scores between the patients and informants tend to 
diverge as the Unstructured task score continues to improve, with the patients rating their Apathy 
more severely than the informants.  This provides some evidence that executive functioning is 
associated with Metacognitive Knowledge and partially supports the hypothesis that this 
cognitive function is associated with awareness in HD.  
 
Is Metacognitive Knowledge Domain Specific? 
It appears that the regression statistic was underpowered as several variables that were 
not significant in the simple correlational analyses became significant in the regression, 
indicating possible suppressor effects. Additionally, the use of difference scores in the regression 
caused the results to be even more difficult to interpret (as explained in the results section of this 
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paper). Therefore, further exploratory analyses were conducted to further examine the 
hypotheses.  
When examining overall group means, informants provided higher ratings of Apathy than 
patients, however, there were no differences between patient and informant ratings of Executive 
Dysfunction and Memory. Notably, the HD patients on average rated their own Apathy and 
Executive Dysfunction above clinical cut-offs, suggesting they may have some awareness of 
these issues. No clinical cut-offs for the EMQ-R exist, so this could not be explored.  
Further analysis was conducted to determine if group differences appeared when 
examining discrepancies between patient and informant report based on informant-rated 
symptom severity. Patients with the lowest informant-rated Apathy were in agreement with the 
informants, while those with the highest informant-rated Apathy underestimated their ratings 
compared to their informants. For Memory and Executive Dysfunction, the bottom tertile patient 
group rated their cognitive problems as more significant than their informants. Only for those 
with the highest informant-rated memory problems and executive dysfunction were the patient 
ratings lower than informant ratings. This suggests that these patients underestimated their 
cognitive issues compared to the informants. Overall, the results indicated that those with the 
most Apathy and Executive Dysfunction, and Memory problems according to informants were 
most unaware of their symptoms, supporting the hypothesis that there is an association with 
worsening apathy, memory and executive functioning and Metacognitive Knowledge.  
To further explore the hypothesis that apathy, executive functioning and memory would 
be associated with Metacognitive Knowledge, comparisons were made between the top and 
bottom tertile groups since it was established that patients in the top tertile group underestimated 
their problems while those in the bottom group either agreed with their informant or 
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overestimated their problems.  When comparing mean predictor variables between these groups, 
those who were most unaware of their Apathy also had the lowest scores on the Stroop 
Interference and TMT-B (both executive functioning tasks) and highest AES-C score (indicating 
more severe clinician-rated Apathy). Similarly, when comparing groups based on informant 
Executive Dysfunction ratings, there were differences between the highest and lowest groups for 
the executive functioning and clinician-rated apathy measure. Finally, when comparing groups 
based on informant memory ratings, there were significant differences in clinician-rated Apathy 
and Stroop scores. These results provide more evidence that Executive Functioning and Apathy 
may be associated with Metacognitive Knowledge in HD, while there is less evidence for the 
relationship between Memory and Metacognitive Knowledge.  
A caveat of using the informants as the standard to create the tertile groups is that this 
may not be an accurate method to measure unawareness. There were almost no differences in 
ratings of apathy, executive functioning, among the patient tertile groups. While this may be 
because the patients are unaware, it may also be because of an unrelated, statistical problem. 
When creating groups based on informant scores, the informant scores may have more of a range 
between tertile groups than the patients. Therefore for the highest and lowest informant-rated 
groups, statistically, patients will most always overestimate compared to informants when 
informants are rating them low and underestimate when informants are rating themselves higher.  
Because of this caveat, the same analyses were conducted by splitting the sample into 
groups based on MoCA score severity, as the MoCA provides an indication of overall cognitive 
dysfunction. Again, patients with the least overall cognitive impairment were in agreement with 
informants on their Apathy ratings, however, those with more cognitive impairment 
underestimated the severity of their Apathy relative to the informants. Patients and informants 
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were in agreement across severity groups for Executive Dysfunction and Memory scores. 
Perhaps this suggests that overall cognitive dysfunction is not enough to produce unawareness 
and there are specific domains of cognitive dysfunction that may be more predictive of the 
development of unawareness.  
The results support other research that has proposed that self-monitoring is an avenue 
through which failures are recognized and is thus important for awareness. Executive functioning 
may also impact memory, which can then impact awareness, as executive functioning is required 
for the retrieval of relevant autobiographical memories (Morris & Mograbi, 2013; Robertson, 
2010). Performance on the Unstructured task and Stroop test have been shown to associated with 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity, an area of the brain also associated with self-reflection, 
evaluation, recollection inhibition and self-monitoring (Leung, Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, & 
Gore, 2000; Potenza et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 2014). The findings are consistent with studies 
that suggest that awareness is associated with the ability to detect errors, which may explain HD 
difficulty providing accurate ratings as HD patients have been shown to have reduced error 
processing (Beste et al., 2006; Clare, 2002; Hannesdottir Metacognitive & Morris, 2007). The 
results also support the theory that apathy may be associated with Knowledge, as emotion tags 
significance or relevance to events, which is important in the ability to recognize failures.  
 
Patient and Informant Report Compared with Objective Cognitive Measures 
The relationship between patient and informant report and the patients’ actual cognitive 
functioning was also examined. While not directly testing the hypotheses, this analysis was 
important to determine if awareness is domain specific and also allowed the exploration of 
Metacognitive Knowledge with objective, cognitive measures. The HD patients’ report of 
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Memory was correlated with performance on memory measures while only informant report of 
Executive Dysfunction was associated with performance on executive functioning measures. 
Similarly, informant Apathy ratings were associated with executive functioning task 
performance, while patient ratings were not. This suggests that HD patients may have a better 
appreciation of their memory functioning versus their Executive Dysfunction and Apathy. Also, 
as a group, the HD patients may be more aware of changes in memory than informants.  
There are several possible explanations for these results. According to research of the 
Dunning-Kruger effect, those who are most unskilled in a particular ability are the least able to 
evaluate their ability in that skill (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Given 
research that has shown significant executive functioning deficits and increased apathy in HD, 
HD patients may not be able to evaluate themselves in these domains because they suffer from 
deficits in the domains. In contrast, past research suggests a relative sparing of memory 
functioning in HD compared to other neurodegenerative disorders, particularly Alzheimer’s 
disease (Fine et al., 2008). In HD, memory problems are characterized by memory retrieval 
deficits, with relative sparing of memory retention (Massman, Delis, Butters, Levin, & Salmon, 
1990). Because memory retention is spared in HD, HD patients may be better equipped to 
evaluate their functioning within this domain. Differences in anosognosia of memory have been 
shown across neurodegenerative disorders depending on the severity of memory impairment 
associated with the disorder. For example, while both AD and vascular dementia patients 
demonstrate worse awareness of memory than controls, vascular dementia patients had a better 
awareness of their memory abilities than AD patients (Morris et al., 2014). Research has shown 
that vascular dementia patients have less memory impairment than AD patients (Looi & 
Sachdev, 1999), which may explain the difference in awareness for memory impairment between 
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groups. It is possible that memory may not contribute to Metacognitive Knowledge in HD, 
except for those who are in most advanced stages of the disease when overall brain functioning 
declines. This supports the hypothesis that problems with executive functioning and apathy may 
be particularly important for the development of unawareness in HD.  
Another explanation is perhaps informants do not detect subtle memory changes that 
patients may notice themselves. Hannesdottir and Morris (2007) proposed that self-report relies 
on a person’s ability to review accumulated information that was gathered over a period of time. 
This would also be true for the informants. In a study comparing MCI and older healthy controls’ 
awareness of memory abilities, the MCI group was more accurate than the control group in their 
self-ratings of verbal memory, which suggests that those experiencing “preclinical” memory 
impairment are more accurate in evaluating memory than controls (Cook & Marsiske, 2006). 
This is consistent with findings in the current study, in that those with relatively more subtle 
changes in memory reported more concerns with memory than the informants.  
Another explanation may be about general beliefs and attitudes towards memory. Studies 
suggest that in the general population, there exist stereotypes about poor memory in aging 
individuals (Levy, 2003). Furthermore, some suggest that laypeople may not be able to 
distinguish among cognitive domains. Schoo, van Zandvoort, Biessels, Kappelle, and Postma 
(2013) suggested that individuals might mistakenly believe they have memory problems, when 
in fact, their memory failure may actually arise from executive functioning deficits rather than 
true memory impairment. Because Executive Dysfunction may impact memory in HD, such as 
the failure to use semantic clustering for example (Fine et al., 2008), HD patients may falsely 
believe their Executive Dysfunction is actually memory impairment, which may be why the 
patients are underreporting Executive Dysfunction. This may indicate that HD patients are aware 
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of their cognitive deficits, but they are wrongly attributing their executive dysfunction to 
memory problems. Further research may be conducted in different groups to determine if this 
pattern of better awareness of memory is specific to HD or if this is a phenomenon that other 
groups experience.  
  
Metacognitive Knowledge and Caregiver Burden, Demographic Characteristics,  
and Disease Progression  
Caregiver Burden. The inclusion of a measure of caregiver burden in this study was an 
attempt to control for a potential bias in the informants’ reports. Caregiver burden was negatively 
associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy suggesting that the informants who 
provided more severe ratings than the patients were also experiencing the most caregiver burden. 
This could mean that unawareness may cause informants to experience more burden, or that 
more burdened informants are likely to rate patients’ symptoms more harshly. A recent study has 
shown that anosognosia is associated with increased use of support services, increased cost to the 
family, and total number of hours of informal care provided by relatives, regardless of dementia 
severity (Turró-Garriga et al., 2016), providing some support that anosognosia is associated with 
increased burden for the family system.  
Gender. Gender was associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy; males were 
less aware of their own Apathy than females. In Parkinson’s disease (PD), one study 
demonstrated an interaction between age and gender, where men were more apathetic in the 
older PD patient group and females were more apathetic in the younger PD patient group (Meyer 
et al., 2015). Further investigation into the relationship may be explored, as there is little research 
examining gender effects in anosognosia.  
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Age. Age was also negatively associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive 
Dysfunction and Memory, suggesting younger patients were more aware of their symptoms than 
older patients.  
Education. There were no relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge variables 
and education. 
Motor Scores. Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Executive Dysfunction were 
negatively associated with motor symptom severity, providing some evidence that disease 
progression is associated with Metacognitive Knowledge.  
 
Metacognitive Knowledge Conclusions 
Results partially support the hypotheses; Executive Functioning, specifically inhibition 
and self-monitoring, was the most prominent cognitive variable associated with Metacognitive 
Knowledge in HD in simple correlational analyses.  Executive functioning is thought to 
contribute to the overall sense of self and allows one to update self-identity when new 
information is presented or when failures occur (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This is consistent 
with past research that shows HD is associated with significant executive functioning decline 
(Paulsen, 2011). There is also some evidence that Apathy is associated with Metacognitive 
Knowledge in HD in exploratory analyses examining differences between patient groups with 
larger or smaller discrepancy ratings with their informants. There is not enough evidence in this 
study to show that decline in memory is associated with Metacognitive Knowledge in HD.  
Regarding specific domains of Metacognitive Knowledge, patients who were most 
severely impaired in a domain tended to be most unaware of symptoms, regardless of domain. 
This is consistent with past research that suggests that agreement between patient and informant 
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on measures of frontally mediated behaviors tends to worsen with overall disease progression 
(Hergert (Blinkoff), Sanchez-Ramos, & Cimino, 2015). The results also suggest that awareness 
may be domain specific in HD. HD patients may have better Metacognitive Knowledge of their 
Memory than Executive functioning and Apathy. This supports past research that has 
demonstrated prominent executive functioning deficits and increased apathy with relatively 
spared memory in HD (Paulsen, 2011) and that those who have more deficits in a specific 
domain tend to be most unaware of their abilities in that domain (Dunning et al., 2003). 
 
Online Awareness 
Online awareness is activated within a specific situation and involves judgments of 
abilities related to that specific situation. According to the Toglia and Kirk model of awareness, 
Anticipatory Online Awareness is the appraisal of a current situation, while Emergent Online 
Awareness is associated with self-monitoring or self-evaluation during a task (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). Online Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory was explored through 
discrepancies between actual performance on tasks found in everyday living and prediction 
(Anticipatory Awareness) and evaluation (Emergent Awareness) ratings of performance. Larger 
discrepancy scores indicated lower ability to predict or evaluate performance. This study used a 
rating approach in which patients were asked to compare their performance to healthy 
individuals without HD with similar, age, gender and education by providing a percentile rating 
(Rosen et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 2010). It was hypothesized that Apathy, Executive 
Functioning, and Memory would be independently associated with Anticipatory (Hypothesis 
Two) and Emergent Awareness (Hypothesis Three) of Executive Functioning and Memory and 
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that Apathy and Executive Functioning would be more strongly related to Online Awareness 
than Memory.  
 
Is Online Awareness Domain Specific?  
Similarly to the Metacognitive Knowledge analysis, the proposed analysis to test these 
hypotheses was to use a multivariate multiple regression approach to examine these 
relationships. Initial correlational analyses, however, did not indicate any convincing 
relationships among the predictor and outcome variables. The multivariate multiple regression 
was underpowered and suppression effects also arose, making the regression analysis difficult to 
interpret. Therefore, exploratory analyses were conducted to further examine Online Awareness.  
For the whole sample, mean performance prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and 
evaluation (Emergent Awareness) ratings were significantly higher than actual performance for 
all NAB Daily Living tasks. While not a test of the hypotheses, this finding could have 
significant implications for daily functioning and safety, as this could mean HD patients may 
overestimate their abilities in similar everyday tasks, such as taking their medications and 
driving. It also supports past research that HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on 
activities of daily living compared to informant report (Hoth et al., 2007). As a group, overall 
predictions and evaluations of memory performance were correlated with actual memory 
performance while this was not true of the relationships between executive function predictions 
and evaluations and actual performance. Similar to the Metacognitive Knowledge that suggested 
that HD patients have a better awareness of memory than executive functioning, these results 
also suggest that HD patients may have a better Online Awareness of memory than executive 
functioning.  
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In examining possible differences between those who are more unaware versus aware, 
those who performed the worst on each NAB task had the largest discrepancies between actual 
performance and prediction and evaluation ratings, suggesting that they had the poorest Online 
Awareness. This is consistent with the other studies that have demonstrated the Dunning-Kruger 
effect. In healthy populations, top performers tend to provide the best estimates of their 
performance compared to the poorer performers. Those who perform the worst on tasks tend to 
overestimate actual level of performance. The effect has shown that the poorer the competency 
in a domain, the larger discrepancy in the estimation that is given by the performer in that 
domain (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2009; Schoo et al., 2013).  This effect has been demonstrated 
in several domains in healthy individuals, including on college exams, and expertise in 
professional domains, such as medical technicians knowledge of medical terminology (Dunning 
et al., 2003; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008). The theory proposes that the 
cognitive mechanisms required to do well on those tasks are the same mechanisms required to 
estimate performance (Dunning et al., 2003). In this study, those who performed poorly on the 
Daily Living Memory NAB tasks, likely have impairments in learning, storage, free recall, 
and/or recognition of verbal information. NAB Judgment performance is associated with deficits 
in problem-solving or poor knowledge of home or health safety issues. NAB Driving difficulty 
may indicate issues with visuospatial working memory, visual scanning, and attention (Stern & 
White, 2003). These cognitive abilities are also associated with the inability to update new 
information about the self according to the CAM model (Morris & Mograbi, 2013), which may 
explain why poor performers on these tasks also had the worst Online Awareness. To relate these 
findings to the hypothesis that executive functioning and memory would be related to online 
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awareness, perhaps cognitive deficits, as shown by poor performance on those specific NAB 
tasks, contribute to an inability to predict or evaluate performance on the task.  
In an attempt to test the hypothesis that apathy, executive functioning, and memory 
would be associated with online awareness, differences in the predictor variables between those 
who were most aware and least aware were explored. Those with the best Online Awareness 
tended to perform better on executive functioning and memory predictor variables, as well as 
having overall lower clinician-rated Apathy. While these analyses do not control for other factors 
and do not establish the independent contributions of these variables, these analyses do provide 
some support for the hypothesis that Apathy, Executive Functioning, and Memory are associated 
with Online Awareness in HD.  
Another explanation is that people have difficulty assessing their own abilities in general. 
People tend to overestimate or are highly optimistic about their abilities. Research has shown 
that people tend to estimate their abilities as “above average”  (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003; 
Dunning, Heath & Suls, 2004). This is statically impossible, in that there is variation in ability 
among the population. In examining these results, this should be taken into consideration, as 
regression effects would make it so people who are the best performers would almost always 
underestimate their performance while the worst performers would almost always overestimation 
their performance and that those who are further away from the mean would be more discrepant. 
There does appear to be a difference, however, in discrepancies between ratings between best 
and worst performers, suggesting that the top performers were more accurate in their ratings than 
bottom performers.  
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Online Awareness and Relationships with Disease Progression and Demographic  
Characteristics 
Motor Scores. Motor scores were not associated with Online Awareness variables.   
Education. There was no relationship between education and Online Awareness 
variables.  
Age. Age was positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Recognition 
Memory and Delayed Memory evaluation suggesting that the older people were more accurate in 
their predictions and evaluations of memory. One explanation may be stereotypes of the 
relationship between cognition and age. Furthermore, it is notable that younger age of symptom 
onset in HD is associated with a more rapid onset of symptoms (Foroud, Gray, Ivashina, & 
Conneally, 1999) (Walker, 2007). According to the Toglia and Kirk model, culture and context 
can influence online awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies have shown that individuals have 
beliefs that their own memory will decline as they age (Clare, 2002; Levy, 2003; Ryan & See, 
1993).  
 
Online Awareness Conclusions  
Overall, HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on Executive Functioning 
and Memory tasks, especially those who perform the poorest on these tasks. There is also some 
evidence that as a group, patients are better at predicting and evaluating memory performance 
than executive functioning, which is similar to findings that Metacognitive Knowledge for 
memory is better than executive functioning. This suggests that awareness in HD is governed by 
local monitoring systems rather than a single metacognitive mechanism. When comparing those 
with the best Online Awareness to those with the worst, those with the smallest discrepancies 
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between performance and ratings also performed the best on measures of Memory, Executive 
Functioning, and had the lowest Apathy, supporting the hypothesis that these factors are related 
to Online Awareness and is consistent with past research that indicates apathy, executive 
functioning, and memory are important cognitive contributors to awareness.  
 
Psychological Explanations for the Results  
Another explanation for the results is that HD patients are experiencing denial and not 
anosognosia. Prigatano (2014) proposed that with true unawareness, there is a lack of self-
perceived issues, while with true denial, there is an unrealistic perception of self.  Both of these 
processes can co-occur. Some suggest that denial can be distinguished from anosognosia in the 
emotional reaction that is displayed by the person following feedback of their performance or 
functioning. A negative reaction is associated with denial, while a perplexed reaction is related to 
anosognosia. It is also suggested that avoidance is a coping behavior associated with denial 
(Kortte, Wegener, & Chwalisz, 2003; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). In this study, participants were not 
provided feedback of results, so it may be difficult to determine which aspects of these results 
are related to denial versus anosognosia. Denial and/or unawareness may also occur for family 
members for similar reasons (Clare, 2002), which is important to consider given that informant 
report was used to measure Metacognitive Knowledge.   
Psychological factors may also promote unawareness as a protective strategy to enhance 
well-being, particularly when there is a perception of loss of control or independence (Clare, 
2002). Therefore, there may be some positive aspect of being unaware of symptoms. Social 
psychology research suggests that healthy individuals selectively attend to information that 
confirms their biases and expectations.  This especially occurs when a person becomes ill or 
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disabled or when a person is exposed to disconfirming feedback of his or her concept of self 
because the self-concept is under threat with the onset of illness. Therefore, minimizing can be 
used as a strategy to cope (Clare, 2002). In fact, several studies suggest that anosognosia is 
inversely related to depression, suggesting anosognosia may provide some protection against low 
mood (Conde-Sala et al., 2013; Kashiwa et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, Toglia & Kirk (2000) suggested that errors are more difficult to recognize 
when the task is more highly valued and more related to self-identity.  For example, for patients 
with traumatic brain injury, performance related to IADLs is frequently overestimated, which 
may be because these tasks are associated with personal control (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The 
NAB Judgment task can be seen as a representation of independence since it asks patients safety 
related questions. If the patient demonstrates that he or she has a deficient knowledge of being 
safe, his or her independence may be threatened.  While not an actual driving task, the NAB 
Driving task may be in a similar category because driving also represents independence. In fact, 
epidemiologic studies suggest that driving cessation in older adults is associated with increased 
depression (Breen, Breen, Moore, Breen, & O Neill, 2007; Ragland, Satariano, & MacLeod, 
2005). Since independence is valued by individuals in general (Ball et al., 2004) it may be more 
difficult for the patients to detect or admit to errors in these tasks.  
 
Study Limitations and Future Directions  
 
Relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness 
Toglia and Kirk (2000) described the relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge and 
Online Awareness as a dynamic process, whereby each type of awareness can influence the 
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other. This is consistent with the idea that individuals use a “top-down” approach when 
estimating performance. That is, individuals begin with an overall belief of their skill and then 
use the belief to estimate how they will do on the specific task (Dunning et al., 2003). For 
example, individuals may be unaware of their symptoms when they are questioned about them, 
but are aware when faced with a task and confronted by their disability (Hannesdottir & Morris, 
2007; Moro, Scandola, Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2014). This suggests that one type of 
awareness may be intact, while the other is not. Further research could examine the relationship 
between Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness in HD.  
 
Addressing Denial versus Anosognosia 
Future studies should include a survey asking patients why they selected the rating that 
they did to gain a better understanding of their ratings. For example, it was not explored if the 
participant truly thought he or she did well on the task or if there was there some fear of 
consequences of doing poorly on the tasks. Future studies may provide feedback and code how 
patients react to determine if they are experiencing denial or true unawareness.  
 
Use of a Comparison Group 
Control Group. This study did not use control participants so it may be difficult to 
determine whether or not people, in general, have a difficult time predicting and evaluating 
performance. Some suggest that even healthy individuals have difficulty predicting and 
evaluating performance (Furnham, 2001), so including controls may help to understand if there 
are relative differences in awareness compared to HD. While this may raise the question if 
anosognosia is pathological, it does seem that it can be particularly detrimental in 
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neurodegenerative populations like HD given possible safety concerns that may arise due to 
overestimation of abilities.   
Alzheimer’s Disease. It may also be worthwhile to complete this study comparing 
Huntington’s disease with Alzheimer’s disease patients, given that memory is impaired while 
executive functioning is relatively spared in AD. It would be interesting to see if differences in 
anosognosia emerged when directly comparing these populations. For example, AD patients may 
show more mnemonic anosognosia than the HD patients. This could demonstrate how deficits in 
different cognitive functions may cause anosognosia to develop in specific domains.  
 
Additional Factors 
There are many other factors that may be associated with awareness in Huntington’s 
disease, such as personality and other psychiatric factors (e.g. anxiety, depression). Future 
research may investigate these factors in relationship to unawareness in this population. 
Additionally, including different cognitive tasks in domains not theorized to be related to 
awareness, such as in language or visuospatial abilities, may be used to demonstrate that memory 
and executive dysfunction are specifically related to awareness and not overall cognition decline.  
Forty-eight percent of the sample was on anti-chorea/antipsychotic medications to 
manage chorea. These medications affect the dopamine system, which may influence the 
expression of frontally-mediated behaviors such as apathy and executive dysfunction or even the 
expression of awareness (Hergert (Blinkoff) et al., 2015). It may be beneficial to examine results 
with a sample of patients who are not taking medications for chorea. 
Recent work suggests that despite overestimations in ratings, the most unskilled also are 
least confident in their ratings (Miller & Geraci, 2011). While confidence in ratings was not 
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explored in this study, the technique has been used in AD. In one study, those rated were rated as 
unaware did not change confidence ratings when given the chance to rate performance 
retrospectively (Cosentino et al., 2016). Confidence in rating is another way of examining 
awareness and may be further explored in future studies. 
 
Methods Limitations 
Statistical Power. While regression was intended to best test the hypotheses, given the 
rarity of HD, a larger number of HD patient and informant pairs could not be recruited. Some 
effects may be small and a larger sample may have been necessary to detect those effects. All 
eligible patients who were in the USF HD Registry, which includes patients who live in the 
entire state of Florida, were approached to participate. Perhaps a multisite study across states 
would be necessary to achieve the numbers needed for sufficient power to detect what could be 
small effects in a multivariate regression framework. 
Patient Past Exposure to Neuropsychological Testing. Many of the patients have been 
exposed to neuropsychological testing, especially since a large portion of the patients in this 
study was recruited from other research studies.  While the NAB is not part of the UHDRS test 
battery typically used in HD studies, perhaps being exposed to neuropsychological tasks may 
skew the results of the performance prediction and evaluation portion of the study if the patients 
have gotten feedback on their performance on similar testing in the past.   
The AES-C. There were several issues with the use of the AES-C as a measure of 
clinician-rated Apathy. The intent was to have a more objective measure of Apathy to serve as a 
predictor variable. As outlined in the introduction, clinician-rated scales are not completely 
unbiased. Also, clinicians are only seeing the patient at one point in time, so they may not get an 
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overall view of the person’s actual functioning on a daily basis. The AES-C was based on the 
patients’ behaviors and responses, so scores may be more reflective of the patient’s perception of 
Apathy. Coding of the patients’ responses was also challenging in that they often provided 
yes/no answers even with prompts or just used the rating terms used by the questionnaire (e.g. 
slightly characteristic, somewhat characteristic).  
The administrator of the AES-C was also not blinded to the study’s hypotheses. The 
AES-C requires at least a bachelor’s level clinician. It is suggested that this clinician has at least 
two years experience within psychological clinical settings (Clarke et al., 2007). The primary 
experimenter was the only study staff member who met these requirements and was available 
when each participant’s study session occurred. This could lead to potential bias in the results of 
this measure and there should be some caution in interpreting the results of this measure. 
However, this is a preliminary study and results may represent at least a proof of concept that can 
be replicated in a study with more staff available.  
There were no relationships between the AES-C and outcome variables in simple 
correlational analyses, however, several relationships emerged with the AES-C variable within 
the regression analyses, indicating there may be a suppressor effect with this variable. 
Suppressor effects occur when a predictor has a significant effect in a regression, only when 
another variable is included and is held constant (Field, 2009). Therefore, results related to the 
AES-C should be interpreted cautiously in the regression analyses, as these effects may emerge 
from small sample sizes or being included with other predictors that are highly correlated 
(Thompson & Levine, 1997).  
EMQ-R. There were no norms for the Everyday Memory Questionnaire – Revised for 
patients or informants so raw scores were used.   
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Executive Functioning Tests. The TMT and Unstructured task are written tests. Studies 
have shown a strong motor component for the TMT (Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002). 
Performance on these tasks may have been influenced by motor and processing speed in addition 
to possible executive function contribution. In future studies in HD, it would be important to 
consider the use other executive tasks that do not rely on motor functioning. Some examples 
include the Iowa Gambling Task, a test of decision-making or the Stockings of Cambridge task, 
a test of planning that has been suggested for use in HD clinical studies (Lezak et al., 2012; Stout 
et al., 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
This research has a number of contributions and implications. This research provides 
insight into the possible contributors of unawareness in HD. It may also contribute to the 
development of a model of anosognosia for basal ganglia dysfunction. The study also provides 
support for using performance prediction and evaluation paradigms in HD for use in future 
studies. Executive Functioning, particularly inhibition and self-monitoring, appears to be related 
to Metacognitive Knowledge in HD, however, the study also provides some preliminary 
evidence that Apathy is also associated with Metacognitive Knowledge. The study also provided 
some evidence for an association between Online Awareness and Executive Functioning, 
Memory, and Apathy. Also, as a group, HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on 
tasks associated with daily functioning. This can have important safety implications for patient 
functioning in day-to-day life. For both Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness, HD 
patients tended to have a better awareness of memory compared with executive functioning and 
apathy, suggesting awareness may be domain specific in this population and may be related to 
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the fact that HD patients tend to have significant executive dysfunction and apathy with 
relatively intact memory. Those with the most severe symptoms across domains, however, 
tended to be most unaware, while those with less severe symptoms tended to be more aware of 
their functioning. Because of this, clinicians should be aware that when gathering information, it 
is important to get perspective from the patient, as patients may have accurate information about 
themselves, particularly for those who are earlier in the disease progression. In contrast, it may 
be important to gather additional information independent of the patient’s report for those whose 
disease is more advanced.  
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APPENDIX A: 
 
PROCEDURE INFORMATION 
 
 
Performance Prediction and Evaluation Scripts and Bell Curve  
 
“In a few moments we will start to do some tasks looking at your thinking abilities. I would like 
to know how well you think you will do on the task compared to other people similar to you. I 
want you to imagine that we gave the same task to 100 healthy people of the same gender, 
similar age and with similar levels of education (So imagine 100 men or women [depending on 
their gender] that are your age and has the same level of education WITHOUT HD). Imagine 
that we then lined them up, based on their scores from best (or highest) to lowest (or worst) 
[Show them the bell curve]. If we look at a group of 100 people, we see that very few people do 
really poorly [point to the low end of the graph], and very few people do extremely well [point to 
the high end of the graph], and most people fall here around the 50th percentile. Ask if the 
participant has questions. These instructions can be repeated as much as necessary.  
Additionally, at some points during the testing, I’m going to stop and ask you to tell me how you 
think you did on the test. When I ask you how you did, I’d like you to tell me how well you think 
you did on the test compared to other people similar to you.” Ask if the participant has 
questions. These instructions can be repeated as much as necessary. 
 
The participant is then presented with the instructions as indicated by standard NAB test 
protocol. Before beginning the task, participants will be asked “Please tell me how you think you 
will perform on this task compared to healthy people like you: below average, average, or above 
average?” Record the participant’s response. Afterwards say, “Ok here the is the graph we 
looked at earlier [present bell curve]. Please point out where you would be on this graph.”  
After the task was completed say, “Please tell me if you think you performed below average, 
average, or above average.” Record the participant’s response. Afterwards say, “Ok here the is 
the graph we looked at earlier [present bell curve]. Please point out where you would be on this 
graph.”  
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Table 1A. Order of counterbalanced neuropsychological tasks.  
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
1. HVLT-R 
Immediate Trials  
2. Stroop 
3. TMT 
4. NAB Judgment 
5. NAB Driving 
6. HVLT-R Delay 
7. NAB Everyday 
Memory Immediate 
8. Unstructured 
Task 
9. NAB Everyday 
Memory Delay 
1. HVLT-R 
Immediate Trials  
2. Stroop 
3. TMT 
5. NAB Driving 
6. NAB Judgment 
6. HVLT-R Delay 
7. NAB Everyday 
Memory 
Immediate 
8. Unstructured 
Task 
9. Everyday 
Memory Delay 
1. NAB Everyday 
Memory Immediate 
2. Unstructured 
Task 
3. Everyday 
Memory Delay 
4. HVLT-R 
Immediate Trials  
5. Stroop 
6. TMT 
7. NAB Driving 
8. NAB Judgment 
9. HVLT-R Delay 
1. NAB Everyday 
Memory Immediate 
2. Unstructured Task 
3. Everyday Memory 
Delay 
4. HVLT-R 
Immediate Trials  
5. Stroop 
6. TMT 
7. NAB Judgment 
8. NAB Driving 
9. HVLT-R Delay 
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APPENDIX B: 
 
INFORMANT DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Subject #: ____________________                               Years of Education: ______________ 
 
Age: ________    Gender: _____________ 
 
Ethnicity (circle one):  
Hispanic/Latino     Non-Hispanic or Latino      Ethnicity Unknown/Prefer not to answer 
 
Race (circle one or more): 
 African-American/Black                   Asian            American Indian/ Alaskan Native           
 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander       White          Race Unknown/Prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your relation to the patient? __________________________ 
 
 
 
How well do you know the patient? (Circle one) 
 
Hardly At All                Not So Well               Fairly Well            Pretty Well           Very Well  
 
 
How long have you known the patient? ___________________ 
 
What is your HD status?   (Circle one) 
Not at risk (no family history, unrelated to the patient) 
At Risk (Family history, but have not had the gene test)   
Gene Positive (had the gene test, but do not have symptoms of HD) 
Gene Negative  (had the gene test and do not have the HD gene) 
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APPENDIX C: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 2A. Patient Disease Characteristics: Main Variables of interest are bolded and have 
skewness and kurtosis listed. 
 N Sample’s 
Score Range 
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
MoCA Raw 56 9 - 28 20.24 5.09   
MoCA z  56 -3.86-1.22 1.22 -.82   
UHDRS 
Motor Score 
56 3-65 29.98 16.77 .245(.319) -1.01 (.63) 
Age Motor 
Sx Onset  
 
Age of 
Diagnosis 
52 
 
 
51 
23-63 
 
 
24-65 
44.88 
 
 
47.45 
10.51 
 
 
9.96 
  
CAG Repeat 
Larger Allele 
44 
 
40-57 
 
43.5 
 
2.88 
 
  
CAP Score 44 308.28-770.22 494.87 88.75 .549 (.36) 1.332 (.71) 
Chorea 
Medications: 
None 
  Risperidone 
   Xenazine 
   Haldol 
   Olazapine 
   Orap 
 
N 
 
29 
19 
1 
1 
4 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
       
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are 
bolded 
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Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics of Predictor Variables Neuropsychological Measures & Apathy 
for the Sample. 
 N Score 
Range 
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Apathy Evaluation 
Scale Total Score 
56 20-66 44.73 11.4 -.399 (.32) -.56 (.63) 
HVLT-R: 
Immediate Total Raw 
Immediate Total T-score 
 
Delay Raw 
Delay T-score 
 
Recognition Raw 
Recognition T-score 
 
 
56 
56 
 
56 
56 
 
56 
56 
 
3-28 
20-49 
 
0-11 
20-55 
 
-1 – 11 
20-52 
 
14.98 
25.89 
 
3.9 
27.27 
 
7.16 
31.21 
 
5.97 
8.71 
 
3.36 
10.54 
 
3.11 
12.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.52 (.319) 
.485 (.319) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.63 (.63) 
-1.5 (.63)* 
Percent Retention Raw 
Percent Retention T-score 
56 
56 
0-117% 
20-65 
56.18 
34.79 
38.83 
16.25 
  
Trail Making Test: 
Trails A Time Raw 
Trails A T score 
 
Trails B Time Raw 
 
53 
 
 
53 
 
18-180 sec 
4-64 
 
36-300 sec 
 
59.28 
31.7 
 
159.73 
 
34.01 
14.79 
 
83.83 
  
Trails B T score 
 
53 4-69 29.77 14.79   
Trails B/A adjusted 
score 
TMT-B-A adj score 
56 
 
56 
-6.1-1.52 
 
-15.9-1.51 
-.99 
 
-4.18 
1.82 
 
4.22 
-1 (.32)* .732(.628) 
Stroop Test: 
Color-Word Raw 
Color-Word T score 
 
55 
55 
 
0-52 
15-60 
 
22.13 
33.66 
 
11.2 
9.76 
  
Interference T score 56 31-64 48.9 6.02 .002 (.319) .5 (.628) 
Unstructured Task: 
# High Value Completed 
# Low Value Completed 
# High Value Attempted 
# Low Value Attempted 
Total Points Earned 
Total Points Standard 
Score (Imputed) 
 
54 
54 
54 
54 
54 
56 
 
0-9 
0-6 
0-3 
0-2 
5-450 
-2.61-.67 
 
3.56 
2 
.57 
.74 
197.44 
-1.3 
 
1.89 
1.45 
.77 
.71 
104.96 
.75 
 
 
 
 
 
-.03 (.325) 
.269 (.319) 
 
 
 
 
 
-.8 (.639) 
-.65(.629) 
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are 
bolded 
Table 4A. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables – Metacognitive Knowledge Variables.  
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 N Score Range Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Everyday Memory: 
Patient Report 
  
Informant Report 
 
 
Discrepancy 
 
56 
 
50 
 
 
50 
 
0-52 
 
0-50 
 
 
-46-33  
 
24.26 
20.7 
 
3.46 
 
15.74 
13.96 
 
2.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.53 (.337) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.44 (.662) 
Apathy: 
Patient Report 
 
Informant Report 
 
 
56 
 
50 
 
30-120 (T) 
 
44-136 
 
72.75 
 
87.96 
 
19.74 
 
19.36 
  
Discrepancy  49 -56-30  -16.1 2.99 
 
-.022(.337) -.624(.662) 
Executive 
Dysfunction: 
Patient Report 
 
 
56 
 
 
37-119 (T) 
 
 
75.45 
 
 
17.32 
  
 
Informant Report 
 
50 
 
44-112 
 
75.67 
 
15.99 
  
 
Discrepancy 
 
49 
 
-47-32 
 
-1.9 
 
2.75 
 
-.633 (.33) 
 
-.394(.662) 
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are 
bolded 
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Table 5A. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables – Performance Prediction Evaluation 
Variables  
 N Score Range Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Judgment Raw 
Judgment %ile 
Prediction 
Discrepancy 
Evaluation 
Discrepancy 
55 
55 
 
55 
54 
9-19 
1-95%ile 
 
-91-57 
-91-56 
13.75 
34.58 
 
-16.92 
-11.21 
2.49 
28.95 
 
32.39 
23.18 
 
 
 
.136 (.322) 
-.096 (.325) 
 
 
 
-.45 (.634) 
-.41(.639) 
Driving Raw 
Driving %ile 
Prediction 
Discrepancy  
Evaluation 
Discrepancy 
54 
54 
54 
 
54 
14-54 
1-55 
-84-22 
 
-94-13 
33.46 
10.11 
-29.37 
 
-35.76 
9.73 
13.67 
26.88 
 
23.18 
 
 
.244(.325) 
 
-.099(.325) 
 
 
-.829(.639) 
 
.004(.639) 
Medication: 
Immediate Raw 
%ile 
55  
3-26 
1-75%ile 
 
17.73 
15.6 
 
5.85 
17.66 
  
 
Delay Raw 
%ile 
 
Recognition 
  
0-9  
1-75 
 
0-2  
 
5.42 
13.36 
 
.67 
 
2.67 
17.29 
 
.72 
  
%ile  1-75 14.2 17.95   
Address: 
Total 
%ile 
55 
 
 
2-22 
1-50 
 
 
13.47 
15.8 
 
4.89 
21.26 
  
Delay 
%ile 
 
Recognition 
%ile 
 0-8 
1-75 
 
1-8 
1-75 
3.18 
14.16 
 
6 
14.2 
2.55 
19.15 
 
1.78 
17.95 
  
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are 
bolded 
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APPENDIX D: 
GENERAL DATA DIAGNOSTICS 
 
  
Missing Data 
All data were inspected for missing data points. Two participants did not complete the 
Unstructured Task and Trail Making Tests because they had difficulty writing due to problematic 
movements. One participant did not complete the Unstructured Task due to time limitations. One 
participant had some problems with vision and had difficulty completing the Trail Making and 
Stroop Tests. One participant is missing the NAB Driving task total score and evaluation score 
because the correct stimulus book was unavailable. That same participant person was missing 
delayed address memory prediction scores due to examiner error. One participant did not 
complete the performance prediction/evaluation part of the study because of time limitations. 
One participant is missing informant FrSBe scores due to informant error in completing the 
form. Forty-four participants had CAG genetic reports available. The rest of the participants (12) 
were diagnosed with HD based on a family history of HD and confirmation by neurologic exam. 
Data imputation was considered to maximize the number of participants included in the 
analysis. Little’s MCAR (Missing Completely at Random) test was conducted for the following 
variables: TMT-A and TMT-B total time and standard score, Unstructured Task total points, and 
Stroop Word, Color, Color-Word Time and Standard score as well as Stroop Interference, and 
the NAB driving total score and performance evaluation. Results of the analysis were non-
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significant, χ2 (24)=22.728, p=.536, indicating that missing data is missing completely at 
random. Multiple imputation is appropriate. Five iterations were created with the MI approach in 
MPLUS. These data iterations were averaged and then the data was added to the original dataset.  
 
Variable Conversions and Calculations 
For questionnaires and cognitive tests where normative data was available, raw scores 
were converted to standard scores. Table 15 indicates the normative corrections available for 
each measure (only measures with normative data are listed).  
 
Table 6A. Normative data available for each measure.  
 Age Gender Race/Ethnicity Education 
FrSBe X X  X 
HVLT-R X    
TMT X X X X 
Stroop X   X 
NAB Tasks 
 
Unstructured 
Task 
X 
 
X 
X  X 
 
 
Examining Normality and Outliers 
Descriptive statistics and skewness and kurtosis were then calculated for all predictor and 
dependent variables. Data histograms for each variable were visually inspected to assess 
normality and to detect outliers. Additionally, guidelines by Field (2009) were used to determine 
deviations from normality by transforming skewness and kurtosis values for each variable into z-
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scores. Any z-score of an absolute value greater than 1.96, was deemed as a significant deviation 
from a kurtosis and skewness of 0 (p<.05), therefore indicating a violation of normality (see 
Table X in Appendix A). Because the HVLT – R Recognition standard score deviated 
significantly from normality because most patient’s standard scores were at floor (T<20), the 
HVLT-R Recognition Raw scores were used instead as these scores are distributed normally, and 
also seem to better capture the range of the participants’ recognition memory abilities.  
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APPENDIX E: 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE 
 
Correlations among Primary Predictors (“Objective” Measures) and Outcome Variables 
Correlational analyses between the Metacognitive Knowledge discrepancy scores and the 
proposed main predictor variables (Unstructured Task Total Points standard score, TMT B/A 
Ratio Score, Stroop Interference score, AES-C total score, and the HVLT-R Recognition) were 
examined. Forty-eight participants were included in this analysis (2 were excluded because they 
were found to be influential data points in the main multivariate regression analysis, therefore the 
same participants were included in this analysis for consistency).  Negative agreement scores 
indicate that the informant provided more severe ratings than the patient provided. The Apathy 
discrepancy score was related to the Unstructured Task Total Points, r=.366, p<.01 and the 
Stroop Interference score r=.383, p<.01. The Executive Dysfunction discrepancy score was 
related to the Stroop Interference Score r=.303, p<.05 (See Figures 1A, 2A, and 3A). There 
were no other relationships with Apathy or Executive Dysfunction discrepancy scores. Memory 
discrepancy scores were unrelated to any predictor variable. 
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Table 7A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Metacognitive 
Knowledge. 
 Unstructured 
Task Points 
Stroop 
Interference 
AES-C HVLT-R 
Memory 
Discrepancy 
ns ns ns ns 
Apathy 
Discrepancy 
.366** .383** ns ns 
EF 
Discrepancy 
ns .303* ns ns 
ns=not significant, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A. Relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Unstructured Task 
Performance. 
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Figure 2A. Relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Stroop Interference 
Scores.  
 
 
Figure 3A. Relationship Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning and Stroop 
Interference. 
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Correlations of Other HVLT-R Memory Indices with Outcome Variables (MCK)  
Exploratory analyses were also conducted to determine if different aspects of memory 
were associated with Metacognitive Knowledge. Analysis of all components of the HVLT-R was 
used to explore which aspects of memory may be associated with anosognosia in HD. The 
HVLT-R has been used in prodromal HD patients to measure learning and encoding using Trial 
1 and Total Score, Retrieval using Delayed Recall Score and Storage using the Discriminability 
and Retention score (Solomon et al., 2007). Apathy discrepancy was related to the HVLT-R 
Trial 1, r=.392, p<.01 and HVLT-R Immediate Memory Total Standard Score, r=.342, p<.05. 
There was a trending relationship between Apathy discrepancy and HVLT-R Delay Raw Score, 
r=.24, p=.097. There were no relationships between other HVLT-R sub-scores and Executive 
Dysfunction or memory discrepancy scores. 
 
Table 8A. Relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge and Memory.  
 
Trial  1 Total Score Delayed 
Recall 
Discriminability  
Apathy 
Discrepancy 
.392** .342* .24+ ns 
Executive 
Functioning 
Discrepancy 
ns ns ns ns 
Memory 
Discrepancy 
ns ns ns ns 
ns=not significant, + trending, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
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Correlations of Other Executive Measures with Outcome Variables (MCK)   
To examine if different aspects of executive function are associated with Metacognitive 
Knowledge, correlations between the MCK outcome variables and each executive task was 
examined. Apathy discrepancy scores were related to the Stroop CW, Stroop Interference, and 
the Unstructured Task Total Points. Executive Dysfunction discrepancy scores were related to 
the Stroop Interference score (See Table 18).  
 
 
Table 9A. Correlations between Executive Measures and Metacognitive Knowledge. 
 
 TMT-B TMT-B-A Stroop CW Stroop 
Interference 
Unstructured Task 
Total Points 
Memory 
Discrepancy 
ns ns ns ns ns 
Apathy 
Discrepancy 
ns ns .295* .383** .366** 
EF 
Discrepancy 
ns ns ns .303* ns 
 
ns= not significant; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
 
Correlations of Other Factors and Outcome Variables (MCK)   
In addition to hypothesized variables, there are several other non-cognitive or emotion 
related variables that were considered that either may be related to awareness or could explain 
results (See Table 19). 
Regarding gender’s relationship with Apathy discrepancy scores, the mean male 
discrepancy score (M=-25, SD=17.55) was higher than the mean female discrepancy score (M=-
11, SD=21.93). While not a control variable, the Apathy discrepancy scores were also related to 
the standardized MoCA score, r=.399, p<.01.  
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Table 10A. Relationships among Metacognitive Knowledge variables and control variables.  
 Apathy Discrepancy Executive Discrepancy Memory Discrepancy 
Age ns -.381** -.294* 
Gender -.315* ns ns 
Motor Scores -.34* -.287* ns 
Education ns ns ns 
Caregiver Burden -.276, p=.055 ns ns 
ns= not significant; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
 
Table 11A. Metacognitive Knowledge Model without Motor Scores. 
OLS Model R2 
Model 1: 
Without 
Motor 
Scores  
R2 Model 
2: With 
Motor 
Scores  
R2 Δ F Value for R2 
Δ 
Overall Significance 
for OLS Model 
Apathy 
Discrepancy 
.409 .411 .002 F(1,38)=.11, 
p=.742 
No Motor: 
F(8,39)=3.376, p<.01 
Motor: 
F(9,38)=2.945, p<.01 
 
EF 
Discrepancy 
.328 .326 .002 F(1,38)=.125, 
p=.726 
No Motor: 
F(8,39)=2.358, p<.05 
Motor: 
F(9,38)=2.063, 
p<.058 
Memory 
Discrepancy 
.285 .286 .01 F(1,38)=.003, 
p=.954 
No Motor: 
F(8, 39)=1.948, 
p=.08 
Motor 
F(9,38)=1.541, 
p=.126 
Model Fit: χ2 (24)=52.317, p<.001. 
 
The model without motor scores also did not deviate from multivariate normality, 
B1p=0.79, X2(10)=7.11, p=0.71, B2p=13.48, zupper=-0.97 zlower=-1.73 (See Table 21 and Figure 28 
for results).  
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Apathy Awareness  
In the model excluding motor scores, Apathy Discrepancy scores were related the Stroop 
Interference score (positive relationship) and the Unstructured Task total score (positive 
relationship). There was a trending relationship with the AES-C total score (positive 
relationship). The Wald test suggests that the coefficients for the AES-C and Stroop interference 
scores are not significantly different χ2 (1)=1.038, p=0.31. The AES-C and Unstructured 
coefficients were also not significantly different χ2(1)=0.496, p=0.48. The Unstructured Task 
and Stroop coefficients were not significantly different χ2(1)=0.159, p=0.68.  
  
 Executive Functioning 
 With motor scores excluded, the Executive Dysfunction Discrepancy scores were related 
to the HVLT-R recognition score (negative relationship) and the Unstructured Task Norms 
(positive relationship). The coefficients were significantly different χ2(1)=8.682, p<.05. 
  
 Memory 
 The Memory Discrepancy score was negatively related to the HVLT-R recognition score.  
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Table 12A. Metacognitive Analysis without Motor Scores (48 participants). 
 Apathy Awareness Executive Awareness Memory Awareness 
Est. SE St. Est Est. SE St. Est Est. SE St. Est. 
Uns. Task 0.399* 0.170 0.314* 0.478* 0.185 0.369* 0.117 0.198 0.087 
Stroop Int. 0.508* 0.208 0.330* 0.161 0.227 0.102 0.032 0.242 0.020 
AES-C 0.254+ 0.130 0.259+ 0.219 0.142 0.219 0.104 0.152 0.100 
HVLT-R -0.202 0.130 -0.215       -0.329* 0.142 -0.343* -0.361* 0.152 -0.362* 
Age -0.003 0.012 -0.036 -0.025* 0.013 -0.284* -0.025+   0.013 0.167+ 
Gender -0.531* 0.254 -0.271* 0.087 0.276 0.044 0.015 0.296 0.007 
Education 0.056 0.054 0.129 0.001 0.058 0.001 0.077 0.063 0.167 
Care Burden -0.253+ 0.136 -0.263+       -0.291* 0.148 -0.296* -0.407* 0.159 -0.398* 
Main Predictors are bolded; * p<.05; + p<.1; Uns. Task = Unstructured Task Total Points 
Standard Score; Stroop Int.=Stroop Interference Scores; HVLT-R=HVLT-R Recognition Scores; 
Care Burden= Caregiver Burden 
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Figure 4A.  Multivariate Multiple Regression Results (no motor scores included).  
 
Black indicates a significant path, Blue indicates a non-significant path. Standardized 
coefficients are reported in the figures.  
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APPENDIX F: 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR ANTICIPATORY AWARENESS 
 
Correlations between Predictors and Anticipatory Awareness Variables 
With the removal of the influential data points from the final regression model (51 
participants), only the AES-C was trending with immediate medication memory r=.284, p<.05. 
Correlations between Additional Variables and Anticipatory Awareness Dependent 
Variables 
With the removal of influential data points, age was associated with address recognition 
memory, r=.479, p<.001.  
Creating Prediction Discrepancy Factor Scores  
The intended analysis was to use a principal components analysis approach to create the 
overall Memory Prediction and Executive Function Prediction factor scores from each NAB 
task’s prediction – performance discrepancy score. The purpose was to reduce the number of 
variables in the main regression analysis. Assumptions were met for the creation of a PCA factor 
score for executive function prediction; the judgment and driving prediction discrepancy scores 
were significantly associated r=.559, p<.001. The KMO suggested adequate sampling (.5) and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant χ2(1)=7.039, p<.01. However, the relationships 
among some memory discrepancy scores were not significant, therefore one factor score could 
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not be created for “memory prediction.” It may also be more beneficial theoretically to examine 
these components of memory separately as they are typically associated with different processes 
(e.g. immediate memory – encoding, delay memory-retrieval, and recognition memory), 
therefore the creation of factors for these variables was explored. There were significant 
relationships between immediate memory for medication and address (r=.495, p<.001), between 
the delay memory for medication and address (r=.535, p<.001), and between recognition 
memory for medication and address (r=.384, p<.01). There was also adequate sampling 
(KMO=.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated PCA was appropriate for these variable pairs 
χ2 (1)=14.78, p<.001 (immediate memory), χ2 (1)=17.38, p<.001 (delayed memory), and χ2 
(1)=8.31, p<.01 (recognition memory). The created factors scores histograms were examined for 
normality. All factor scores had a normal distribution. 
There was only a trending relationship between the executive factor predictor score and 
HVLT-R recognition raw scores, r=.232, p=.091. The factor prediction scores were unrelated to 
any other predictor variable. Relationships were also examined between the factor scores and the 
control variables (age, gender, education, and motor scores). Age was associated with memory 
recognition prediction, r=.338, p <.05. There was a trending relationship between motor scores 
and delayed memory, r=-.243, p=.077.  
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Table 13A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Anticipatory 
Awareness.  
Anticipatory 
Awareness: 
AES-C Stroop 
Interference 
Unstructured 
Task 
HVLT-R 
Recognition 
Executive 
Factor 
ns ns ns .232, p=.091 
Immediate 
Memory 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
Delayed 
Memory 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
Recognition 
Memory 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
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APPENDIX G: 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR EMERGENT AWARENESS 
 
Correlations between Predictors and Emergent Awareness Variables 
Performance Evaluation scores were calculated by subtracting the patient ratings from the 
actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask. AES-C was related to 
medication immediate memory, r=.294, p<.05. Age was associated with medication delay 
memory evaluation, r=.302, p<.05 and address delay memory evaluation, r=.348, p<.05. No 
other relationships were detected.  
 
Creating Evaluation Discrepancy Factor Scores  
Assumptions were met for the creation of a PCA factor score for executive function 
evaluation; the judgment evaluation and driving evaluation scores were significantly associated 
r=.622, p<.001. The KMO suggested adequate sampling (.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
indicated was significant X2(1)=25.194, p<.001. Factor scores were also created for immediate 
memory evaluation (medication and address relationship, r=.701, p<.001), delay memory 
evaluation (relationship r=.609, p<.001), recognition memory (relationship r=.417, p<.01).  
 There was also adequate sampling (KMO=.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated 
PCA was appropriate for these variable pairs X2(1)=35.54, p<.001 (immediate memory), 
X2(1)=23.9, p<.001 (delayed memory), and X2(1)=10.02, p<.01 (recognition memory). The 
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created factors scores histograms were examined for normality. All factor scores had a normal 
distribution. The only relationship present between factor scores and main predictors was the 
AES-C and the Recognition Memory score (r=.285, p<.05).  
 
Table 14A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Emergent 
Awareness. 
Emergent 
Awareness: 
AES-C Stroop 
Interference 
Unstructured 
Task 
HVLT-R 
Recognition 
Executive 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
Immediate 
Memory 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
Delayed 
Memory 
Factor 
ns ns ns ns 
Recognition 
Memory 
Factor 
.285, p<.05 ns ns ns 
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APPENDIX H:  
Institutional Review Board Approvals 
 
 
 
October 26, 2015 
Danielle Hergert, M.A. Psychology  
4202 E. Fowler Avenue PCD 4118G 
Tampa, FL 33620 
RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review 
IRB#: Pro00023422 
Title: The Independent Contributions of Emotion and Cognitive Dysfunction on Anosognosia in 
Huntington’s Disease Patients 
Study Approval Period: 10/25/2015 to 10/25/2016 
Dear Ms. Hergert: 
On 10/25/2015, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above application 
and all documents contained within, including those outlined below. 
Approved Item(s): Protocol Document(s): Pro00023422_Protocol V1 
Consent/Assent Document(s)*: 
Informant Consent_V1.pdf Patient Consent_V1.pdf Informant Online V1 **granted a waiver 
*Please use only the official IRB stamped informed consent/assent document(s) found under the 
"Attachments" tab. Please note, these consent/assent document(s) are only valid during the approval 
period indicated at the top of the form(s). **Waivers are not stamped. 
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It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for expedited review which includes 
activities that (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve 
only procedures listed in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review research 
through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45CFR46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110. The research 
proposed in this study is categorized under the following expedited review category: 
(4) Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation) 
routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. Where 
medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for marketing. 
(5) Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected, or 
will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or diagnosis). 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on 
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and 
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, 
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the informed consent process as outlined in the 
federal regulations at 45CFR46.116 (d) which states that an IRB may approve a consent procedure which 
does not include, or which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent, or waive the 
requirements to obtain informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that (1) the research 
involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect 
the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) the research could not practicably be carried out without the 
waiver or alteration; and (4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent 
information after participation. 
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the documentation of informed consent as 
outlined in the federal regulations at 45CFR46.117(c) which states that an IRB may waive the 
requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds either: 
(1) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the consent document and the 
principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. Each subject will be 
asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, and the subject's 
wishes will govern; or (2) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and 
involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context. 
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirement for signed authorization as outlined in the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule regulations at 45CFR164.512(i) which states that an IRB may approve a waiver or alteration 
of the authorization requirement provided that the following criteria are met (1) the PHI use or disclosure 
involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals; (2) the research could not practicably 
be conducted without the requested waiver or alteration; and (3) the research could not practicably be 
conducted without access to and use of the PHI. 
[A partial waiver of HIPAA Authorization is granted for recruitment purposes only; Authorization will be 
obtained as part of the informed consent process. Pursuant to this partial waiver, the study team is allowed 
to access the USF Huntington's Disease Research Registry to obtain PHI of patients who provided their 
informed consent to participate in the registry to determine whether they meet inclusion criteria for this 
study. ] 
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in accordance 
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with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the approved research 
must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval via an amendment. Additionally, all unanticipated 
problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5) calendar days. 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South 
Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions 
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
Sincerely, 
 
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson  
USF Institutional Review Board 
 
 
9/28/2016 
Danielle Hergert, M.A.  
Psychology  
4202 E. Fowler Avenue Tampa, FL 33620 
RE: Expedited Approval for Continuing Review 
IRB#: CR1_Pro00023422 
Title: The Independent Contributions of Emotion and Cognitive Dysfunction on Anosognosia in 
Huntington’s Disease Patients 
Study Approval Period: 10/25/2016 to 10/25/2017 
Dear Danielle Hergert: 
On 9/28/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above application 
and all documents contained within including those outlined below. 
Approved Item(s): Protocol Document(s): 
Pro00023422_Protocol V2_Jan182016_Clean 
The waiver of informed consent process, waiver of documentation of consent and the waiver of HIPAA 
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for recruitment/screening purposes only authorization have been renewed. 
The IRB determined that your study qualified for expedited review based on federal expedited category 
number(s): 
(4) Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation) 
routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. Where 
medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for marketing. 
(5) Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected, or 
will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or diagnosis). 
 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on 
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and 
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, 
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in accordance 
with USF HRPP policies and procedures and as approved by the USF IRB. Any changes to the approved 
research must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval by an amendment. Additionally, all 
unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5) calendar days. 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South 
Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions 
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
Sincerely, 
 
John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson  
USF Institutional Review Board 
 
 
